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GOVERNMENT AND THE MILK INDUSTRY
GOVERNMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PRICE
STANDARDS IN THE MILK INDUSTRYt
By RICHARD C. CADWALLADER*M osT lawyers, despite the flurry of milk control legislation
and cases in recent years probably do not realize the eco-
nomic importance of the "milk industry"' to the general welfare
of the country. It is the largest of all industries, surpassing the
steel business, the coal industry, the motor car industry, and any
other business that one may care to name. In addition to the
thousands of persons interested in the processing, sale, and dis-
tribution of milk and its products, over five million out of our six
million farm families are involved to some degree with milk.
With the coming of the depression, the milk industry found
itself burdened with heavy surpluses, and unfair trade practices
which brought about a breakdown in the incomes of those depen-
dent on milk.
The resultant strikes and public seethings brought prompt
legislative action by federal and state governments to place the
milk industry under economic regulation. This was made easier
by the fact that the milk industry had for many years been subject
to sanitary regulation.
Five years have intervened since this gigantic experiment was
initiated, and we are witnessing a general reluctance on the part of
government to face reality and withdraw from this field of eco-
nomic regulation, in which it has made a very poor showing.
Politicians may delight in "pointing with pride" to their accom-
plishments, but such claims will not stand up under cold factual,
legal and economic scrutiny.
What should the future bring? What is it likely to bring?
The outcome will be of the greatest importance not only for the
milk industry, but for all other businesses that operate under
*Member of the Louisiana Bar. Engaged in legislative research work at
Louisiana State University Law School.
Many persons active in both federal and state milk control adminis-
trations, in cooperative associations, in processing and distributing com-
panies, on creamery journals, and in the legal and teaching professions
have answered questions, furnished data and given helpful criticism; to all
of these I wish to express my appreciation for their invaluable aid.
'This term is used to include milk producers, and fluid milk, ice cream,
cheese, evaporated, condensed, dry milk, and butter processor-distributors.
Cf. the composition of the Dairy Industry Committee, 1107 Barr Build-
ing, Washington, D. C.
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private ownership and management. The whole problem deserves
and is receiving the attention of some of our ablest economists
and legal thinkers.
The purpose of this article will be to examine and evaluate
these legal and economic problems in the light of the history of
the milk industry, and to consider critically some tentative hypo-
theses.
2
I. INTEGRATION AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
A. Early Aspects.-In 18903 the milk industry was poorly or-
ganized and existed mainly on a local basis. There were no proces-
sor-distributor organizations which were national in scope, and no
powerful interstate farmers' cooperative marketing units. Nor did
the constituent elements have well-knit lobbying organizations in
Washington.
From a legal standpoint, the drive from that time down to
1916 was the effort to get inspection, testing, grading, laboratory
standardization, pasteurization, and other regulatory health laws
passed by the states, cities, and towns.4 In every state the police
power was relied on to control milk supplies, by means of state
legislation and local ordinances. True, some writers of the time
were speaking of coordination, but they wanted it mainly because
it would bring improved sanitation by making enforcement easier.
Dr. M. J. Rosenau, Professor of Preventive Medicine at the
Harvard Medical School, wrote a book in 1912 which is typical
of the pre-war period.5 He pleaded for better sanitary control,
and felt that combination and integration would help bring it about.
He considered application of anti-trust legislation to the milk
industry a mistake, and argued that concentration of the business
of processing and distributing milk even to the extent of an abso-
lute monopoly was a desirable thing, since it would make for
easy enforcement of health laws, introduce better equipment and
21n considering the problem of governmental regulation, I have inten-
tionally omitted any detailed analysis of the public health aspects, and
have tried to deal mainly with the development of governmental control
of prices.
$The year of the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is selected
as a point of origin because the philosophy of price control by government
received its greatest impetus at this time.4Grading and Labeling of Milk and Cream, by Committee on Agricul-
ture of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, August, 1918. For a digest of
cases and materials on this public health supervision and control of milk
and its products up through 1936, see: Tobey, The Legal Aspects of
Milk Control (1936).
5Rosenau, The Milk Question (1912).
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trained personnel, and allow economic use of surplus milk.6 We
find him complaining:
"Competition is not the life of trade in the milk industry. Coin-
petition accounts for a certain amount and kind of 'life' in milk-
namely, bacterial life. In other words, commercial competition
hurts the quantity and quality of the milk supply. Cooperation
is the watchword." 7
One of the notable early efforts to ascertain the economic
effect of integration was the Rochester Milk Survey conducted by
Dr. John R. Williams." He investigated the number of homes
served by each milk route, miles traveled, and cost of distribution
in Rochester, New York, and recommended a model system of
unified fluid milk distribution, saying:
"The City of Rochester owns its water works, collects its own
ashes, operates an incinerating plant for the sorting and disposal
of garbage, and controls the collection of its garbage. All of
these activities bear an important relation to the public health,
but none the less does milk. Why, therefore, should not cities
control their own milk supplies to the end that the people may
have pure, wholesome milk at the minimum cost?"
With the start of the World War, the European nations soon
found themselves unable to supply their armies and civilian
populations with food by their own efforts. They discovered that
evaporated milk and condensed milk, which had been produced
on a small scale up until 1900,9 were ideal foodstuffs from the
viewpoint of sustenance, ease of transportation, cost, and keeping
qualities. With Switzerland, the only large producing country
besides the United States, unable to increase her output material-
ly, the belligerents (mainly the Allies) turned to the United States
and Canada for a supply.
By 1914 there was a large degree of concentration in the pro-
duction of canned milk, which had developed from control of
patents, location of production units, control of marketing outlets,
large capital necessary to start producing units and the like. 0 At
6Rosenau, The Milk Question (1912).
7Rosenau, The Milk Question (1912).
sWilliams, The Economic Problems of Milk Distribution in their
Relation to the Public Health, Transactions of the Fifteenth International
Congress on Hygiene and Demography, Washington, D. C., 1912.
9For an interesting sketch of the development of this phase of the milk
industry see Baumgartner, The Condensed Milk and Milk Powder Indus-
tries, Bulletin of the Department of History and Political and Economic
Science in Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. (1920.)
1OBaumgartner, The Condensed Milk and Milk Powder Industries,
Bulletin of the Department of History and Political and Economic Science
in Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. (1920) 23-26.
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that time, three companies-Borden, Carnation, and Helvetia-
produced 56.5 percent of the country's output, while in 1918
the same three companies with the addition of the Nestle's Food
Company," produced 54.2 percent, and ten companies at that
time produced 76.7 percent of the total canned milk manufactured
in the United States, although there were 120 companies contribut-
ing to the total.1 2  During this same period the total exports of
canned milk (evaporated and condensed) from the United States
jumped from 22,831,904 pounds valued at $1,944,788 in 1914 to
852,181,414 pounds valued at $121,817,737 in 1919, an increase of
3,732 percent.13 The production of canned milk in the United
States went from 660,006,000 pounds in 1914 to 1,798,082,000
pounds in 1919, an increase of 272 percent. Thus, it can be seen
that though there was a tremendous increase in total production,
it remained in the hands of the same companies practically, and to
an even greater extent was the export trade in canned milk close-
ly controlled."
"This company had a remarkable growth. It was organized in New
York as a subsidiary of Nestle and Anglo-Swiss Co., a Swiss company.
In 1915 it began to buy canned milk, and in that year purchased 1,000,000
cases, in round numbers. By 1918 it had taken over the Hires Condensed
Milk Company and its five subsidiary companies (whose plants were in
Michigan, Vermont, and New York), the International Milk Products
Co., (which operated four plants in New York state), and the John Wildi
Evaporated Milk Company, a Delaware corporation which owned John
Wildi Evaporated Milk Co., an Ohio Corporation, and stock in Delavan
Condensed Milk Co., an Illinois Corporation. In 1918 the Nestle Food
Co. through its subsidiaries produced milk in thirteen factories, and
in addition controlled the output under one, two, and three year contracts
of thirty-one other factories operated by ten companies. Altogether,
this company was in a position in that year to produce and purchase under
contract about 8,000,000 cases, or about one-fourth of the total production
of the United States. See: pp. 58-62, Report of the Federal Trade
Commission on Milk and Milk Products, 1914-1918, (1921).
"2Pp. 56-58, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Milk and
Milk Products, 1914-1918, (1921). This movement towards corporate cel-
tralization is further illustrated by the fact that on August 23, 1937, there
were only thirty-seven (37) independent business units (organized into
forty-eight (48) companies) engaged in manufacturing evaporated milk.
List of Manufacturers of Evaporated Milk, issued by Evaporated Milk
Association, August 23, 1937.
"3See table, List of Manufacturers of Evaporated Milk, issued by
Evaporated Milk Association, August 23. 1937.
14See: Contract of January 2, 1918, between Nestle & Anglo-Swiss
Co. and The Borden Co., by which the former was allowed to sell con-
densed and evaporated milk in the -United States and Canada, provided it
gave the Borden Co. one-half of the total net profits earned by it on such
business, and the latter was given a similar right in Europe on the same
condition. Also see the two prior agreements which it modified. All are
reprinted as Exhibit 7, in Appendix, pp. 145-168, of Federal Trade Com-
mission Report on Milk 1914-1918, which suggested that they violated
the federal anti-trust laws (Summary, p. 21).
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This huge expansion of production of canned milk meant that
more fluid milk had to be found, and since it was impossible to
increase suddenly the milk output of our cow population to any
large extent, the condenseries entered the market and offered
prices that took large supplies from cheese, butter, and fluid milk
processors. This factor, coupled with generally rising prices,
sent the costs of milk and milk products sky-high as far as the
consumer was concerned. But this did not appreciably benefit
the producer, who was himself subject to greatly increased costs.
Tremendous agitation developed, which soon became articulate
under the leadership of newspapers and politicians. From the
initiation of the war period forward we find investigations and
surveys being launched by individuals,15 chambers of commerce,1 6
cities, 17 states,' and the federal government. 9  They all em-
15Jennings, Study of the New York City Milk Problem, (1919);
MacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem-in Sanitation, Economics, and Agri-
culture (1917); Straus, The Relations of the City to the Milk Supply,
(1915) 5 Am. J. of Pub. Health 11.
16The Milk Question in New England, under the auspices of the
Boston Chamber of Commerce, 1917, R. W. Bird, Chairman; Dr. A. C.
Gilbert, Secretary. Milk Survey of Spokane, Washington, Chamber of
Commerce, 1919.
'
7Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York.(1917); North, The Rochester Milk Survey, under the auspices of the
Committee on Public Safety of the Common Council of the City of Roch-
ester, New York (1919); Milk Market Situations in the Cities of San
Francisco Bay, Univ. of California (1917).
l8 Report of the Governor's Tri-State Commission of Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Delaware, Bull. No. 387, Pennsylvania State Department
of Agriculture, Dr. Clyde L. King, Chairman, (1917). Also, Preliminary
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Dairy Products, Live Stock
and Poultry of the New York State Senate and Assembly (Wicks Inves-
tigation) 1916-1917, (1917) ; Report of the Fair Price Committee of the City
of New York, Dr. Royal S. Copeland, Health Commissioner of New York
City, Chairman, made to Governor Smith, Dec. 2, 1919, Leg. Doc. No.
39; Preliminary Report of the Council of Farms and Markets of Its Inves-
tigation of the Cost of Production and Distribution of Milk in New York
State, W. A. Danna, Chairman, Report submitted to the Legislature of
New York State at Albany, April 18, 1919; Report of the Committee on
Food Production and Distribution, of the Reconstruction Commission of
New York State, Mr. Thomas V. Patterson, Chairman, 1919; Prelimi-
nary Statement of the Commissioners appointed by Governor Smith to
report to him in the matter of the High Cost of Living, signed by
Martin H. Glynn, late governor of the state of New York. and Dr. John
H. Finley, Commissioner of Education (1919); Report of Rhode Island
Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Resources of the State (1916).
19 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Milk and Milk Prod-
ucts, 1914-1918, (1921). See also: Report of the Milk Committee
appointed by the Food Controller for Canada to Investigate Milk Supplies
for Urban Municipalities, P. B. Tustin, Chairman; The Production, Dis-
tribution and Food Value of Milk-a Report to Herbert C. Hoover,
United States Food Administrator, by the Milk Committee, Clyde L.
King, Chairman (1918).
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phasized that milk was of the utmost importance to the public
health and offered various schemes for reducing the prices to the
public. Many of them enunciated the value of a "legalized
monopoly and public control." Among other things, these groups
and reports advanced the following ideas:
1. That the processing and distribution of fluid milk should
be a regulated public utility service.2
2. That the legislature should declare the milk business to be
one affected with a public interest, and that state milk commissions
should be created to regulate the milk distribution business by
issuing licenses. Such commission to have power to fix prices,
etc.
21
3. That municipalities should be authorized to acquire and
operate milk distributing systems within their boundaries.
2 2
20The Production, Distribution and Food Value of Milk-a Report
to Herbert C. Hoover, U. S. Food Administrator, at p. 27; Preliminary
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Dairy Products, Live Stock
and Poultry of the New York State Senate and Assembly (Wicks Inves-
tigation) at p. 578; Report of Committee on Food Production and Dis-
tribution, of the Reconstruction Commission of New York State, Mr.
Thomas V. Patterson, Chairman, 1919; Report of the Governor's Tri-
State Commission, of Pennsylvania, Maryland- and Delaware, Bull. No.
387, Pennsylvania State Department of Agriculture, Dr. Clyde L. King,
Chairman, 1917. Report of the Fair Price Committee for the City of
New York, Dr. Royal S. Copeland, Health Commissioner of New York
City, Chairman, made to Governor Smith, Dec. 2. 1919, Leg. Doe. No.
39; North, The Rochester Milk Survey, under the auspices of the Coin-
mittee on Public Safety of the Common Council of Rochester, N. Y.
1919.
21Preliminary Statement of the Commissioners appointed by Governor
Smith to report to him in the matter of the High Cost of Living, signed
by Martin H. Glynn, late Governor of the State of New York and Dr.
John H. Finley, Commissioner of Education; The Production, Distribution
and Food Value of Milk-a report to Herbert C. Hoover, United States
Food Administrator, by the Milk Committee, Clyde L. King, Chairman
(1918) ; Report of the Fair Price Committee of the City of New York,
Dr. Royal S. Copeland, Health Commissioner of New York City, Chair-
man, made to Governor Smith, Dec. 2, 1919, Leg. Doc. No. 39.
22Report of the Committee on Food Production and Distribution, of
the Reconstruction Commission of New York State, Mrs. Thomas V.
Patterson, Chairman (1919) ; Straus, The Relations of the City to the
Milk Supply, (1915) 5 Am. J. of Public Health 11; Report of Rhode
Island Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Resources of the State
(1916) ; Report of the Fair Price Committee of the City of New York,
Dr. Royal S. Copeland, Health Commissioner of New York City, Chair-
man, made to Governor Smith, Dec. 2, 1919, Leg. Doc. No. 39; North,
The Rochester Milk Survey, under the auspices of the Committee on
Public Safety of the Common Council of the City of Rochester, New
York (1919).
However, some persons argued strongly that though amalgamation
would be a good thing, it should be accomplished under private ownership
subject to strict public regulation rather than by making it government-
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4. That in nearly every city there are too many dealers and
that there is a large duplication of routes,23 which makes for high
cost of distribution, which can be reduced by abolishing competi-
tion and duplication through centralizing the distributing system
into a single company.2 4
5. That the cost of production can be reduced by: (a) eliminat-
ing low producing cows; (b) collective hauling of milk; (c) col-
lective buying of grain.2 5
6. That dealers should be permitted without fear of the law
to enter into common negotiations for the purchase of the neces-
sary quantity required by them in their business. 2
owned-and-operated. See: Recommendations of Public Safety Committee
of Common Council, in Rochester Milk Survey, (1919).
See: MacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem-in Sanitation, Economics,
and Agriculture, (citing Taussig) and the testimony of Professor Robert
E. Chaddock of the Economics Faculty of Columbia University, before
the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York, December, 1917, at
pp. 71-72, where he said, "It seems to me that the middleman agency is
probably the best qualified to determine the price. Your middleman is in
a strategic position to know what he can buy a given supply for, and
on the other hand what he can get people to pay for that supply. The
consumer wishes cheap milk, and the producer wishes to receive as large
an amount as he can. Neither one of these parties has the facilities for
getting together to determine the balance between the force of the demand
and the force of the supply. The middleman's interest combines the
interest both of the consumer and the producer. . . . I doubt the efficiency
of the city as a distributor of milk. I consider that a very last resort.
I have not very much faith in the efficiency of the city of New York in
conducting the milk business."
23New York Preliminary Report of the Council of Farms and Mar-
kets of its Investigation of the Cost of Production and Distribution of
Milk in New York State, W. A. Danna, Chairman, Report submitted to
the Legislature of New York State at Albany, April 18, 1919; Report
of the Governor's Tri-State Commission of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Delaware, Bull. No. 387, Pennsylvania State Department of Agriculture,
Dr. Clyde L. King, Chairman, (1917).
24The Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York, 1917. Milk
Survey of Spokane, Washington, Chamber of Commerce, (1919); Prelimi-
nary Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Dairy Products, Live
Stock and Poultry of the New York State Senate and Assembly (Wicks
Investigation) 1916-17, (1917); MacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem, ch.
v, p. 170; North, The Rochester Milk Survey, under the auspices of
the Committee on Public Safety of the Common Council of the City of
Rochester, New York (1919); Jennings, Study of the New York City
Milk Problem; Milk Market Situation in the Cities of San Francisco Bay,
University of California (1917).
25Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York
(1917) ; Report of the Governor's Tri-State Commission of Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Delaware, Bull. No. 387, Pennsylvania State Department
of Agriculture, Dr. Clyde L. King, Chairman, (1917).
26Preliminary Report of the joint Legislative Committee on Dairy
Products, Live Stock and Poultry of the New York State Senate and
Assembly (Wicks Investigation) 1916-1917, (1917) p. 338.
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7. That costs of milk production are reasonable and prices
asked by producers are justified. 27
8. That the dealer's cost of distribution is justified.28
9. That some solution must be found for the surplus milk
problem.
29
10. That producers' cooperatives should be organized and
fostered and to some degree controlled by the state.30
11. That the milk problem of the time was caused by the drive
by the public for increasingly sanitary milk, while not wishing to
pay the increased cost necessary to allow the farmer to produce
the higher grade fluid milk.31
12. That immediate and diligent attention should be given to
violations of existing laws.3 2
13. That since many of the problems connected with the milk
industry are interstate and national in character, they should
receive the serious attention of the National Congress. Interstate
regulation and control will assist materially in a final solution of
all the problems involved.
3 3
One writer at the end of the War Period summed up the
general viewpoint rather well when he wrote, 34
27Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York (1917).28Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York
(1917) ; New York Preliminary Report of the Council of Farms and
Markets of its Investigation of the Cost of Production and Distribution
of Milk in New York State, W. A. Danna, Chairman, Report submitted
to the Legislature of New York State at Albany, April 18, 1919.
29New England Milk Investigation under the auspices of the Boston
Chamber of Commerce (1917); New York Preliminary Report of the
Council of Farms and Markets of its Investigation of the Cost of Pro-
duction and Distribution of Milk in New York State, W. A. Danna, Chair-
man, Report submitted to the Legislature of New York State at Albany,
April 18, 1919; Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New
York (1917).3
°MacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem-in Sanitation, Economics, and
Agriculture, ch. ii, pp. 31-64; Preliminary Report of the Join Legisla-
tive Committee on Dairy Products, Live Stock and Poultry of the New
York State Senate and Assembly (Wicks Investigation) 1916-1917, (1917)
p. 338.3lMacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem-in Sanitation, Economics, and
Agriculture, ch. ii, pp. 31-64.32 Preliminary Statement of the Commissioners appointed by Governor
Smith to report to him in the matter of the High Cost of Living, signed
by Martin H. Glynn, late Governor of the state of New York, and Dr.
John H. Finley, Commissioner of Education (1919) ; See letter of Health
Commissioner Haven Emerson to Mayor John Purroy Mitchel on October
1, 1917; Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York
(1917) p. 4.33Report of the Fair Price Milk Committee of the City of New York,
Dr. Royal S. Copeland, Health Commissioner of New York City, Chair-
man, made to Governor Smith, Dec. 2, 1919, Leg. Doc. No. 39.
34Frederiksen, The Story of Milk (1919).
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"In the large cities there has grown up an industry which
largely monopolizes the milk supply and which until lately was
powerful enough to dictate prices and conditions both for producers
and consumers."3
After going on to indicate that he felt the middleman would be
eliminated, he said,
"It should not be forgotten, however, that while the much
abused middlemen in times past have been able to dictate terms
and prices and have often abused the privilege, they have at the
same time used their influence and power to improve the milk
supply. As the supply of oil and gasoline has been perfected and
cheapened by the all-powerful Standard Oil Co. as a monopoly
crushing all competition, so the 'Milk Trust' has improved the
distribution of milk and has built up magnificent sanitary plants
in which milk is handled, pasteurized, bottled, and distributed in a
way that might not have been possible without the monopoly. It
has served a good purpose, but has at the same time acquired
such power that official control has become necessary for the
protection of producer and consumer alike, and the time may be
near when these two classes will combine and take the matter into
their own hands so that the distribution may be done at actual
cost."3 1
B. United States Food Administration.-During the period of
the World War, the only effective instrument of government con-
trol was the United States Food Administration, which had a
Milk Committee. However, price fixing in the milk and milk
products industries was studiously avoided by the United States
Food Administration.3 7  Margins and profits were required to be
reasonable under the licenses issued, and in some cases maximum
margins were specifically set.3 8 Control of exports of canned
milk was exercised by the Food Administration through licenses
by the War Trade Board.3 9
Milk, butter, cheese, and condensed, evaporated, and powdered
milk were among the sixty-odd food commodities that were put
under license control by proclamation of the president on October
8, 1917.40 Importers, manufacturers, storers, and distributors of
35Frederiksen, The Story of Milk (1919) 39-40.36Frederiksen, The Story of Milk (1919) 40-41.37See letter from the Food Administration to the Boston Fruit and
Produce Exchange, Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918,
p. 119.38This was in connection with the cold storage price of butter at New
York and Chicago, Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918.
p. 118.39Federal Trade Commission, Report on Milk, 1914-1918, p. 140.40Messages from the president of the United States transmitting reports
of the United States Food Administration for the year 1917, Exhibit E,
p. 22.
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milk and milk products were required to secure licenses from the
United States Food Administrator on or before November 1, 1917.
To operate without license or after the revocation of license sub-
jected the offender to a fine of $5,000 or two years' imprisonment
or both.41 However, retailers whose gross sales did not exceed
$100,000 a year, although subject to the provisions of the food
control act against hoarding, speculation, combination, and exces-
sive profits, were, along with farmers and some others, excepted
from the license control provided by the proclamation. 42  They
were reached through appeals to patriotism, local price-deterinin-
ing boards, and Rule 17 requiring them not to deal with persons
violating the food control act.
43
To supplement and administer these licenses, many general
and special rules and regulations were issued and enlarged or
modified from time to time." These prohibited speculation, secret
rebates, combination sales, and unfair practices and restricted re-
sales within the same trade. They also provided that licensees
should keep their property and records open to inspection by
authorized representatives of the Food Administration and make
such sworn reports concerning the conditions and management of
their business as the Food Administration might require. Un-
reasonable prices were prohibited as to transactions in the United'
States, but margins of profit from export transactions were un-
regulated. Cold-storage warehouse charges were required not to
be unreasonable or discriminatory. All cold-storage rates had to
be filed with the United States Food Administration.
45
The three main objects of the general and special regulations
issued in exercise of license control were:
A. To limit the prices charged by every licensee to a reason-
able amount over expenses, and forbid the acquisition of specula-
tive profits from a rising market.
B. To keep all food commodities moving in as direct a line
and with as little delay as practicable to the consumer.
41Sec. 5, Food and Fuel Control Act, August 10, 1917 (Pub. No. 41,
65th Congress).
42Sec. 5, Food and Fuel Control Act, August 10, 1917 (Pub. No. 41,
65th Congress).
43(1918) Annual Report of the United States Food Administration 62.
44(1918) Annual Report of the United States Food Administration,
Exhibit K, p. 59.
45(1918) Annual Report of the United States Food Administration,
(opinion A-125, December 10, 1918) 60-61.
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C. To limit as far as practicable contracts for future delivery
and dealings in future contracts.48
Voluntary agreements on the prices of market milk through
the mediation of milk commissions appointed by the Food Admin-
istration were reached in 1917-1918 between the producers and
processor-distributors in certain localities.47  The Food Admini-
strator appointed such federal commissions with great reluctance,
and only when requested by consumer or producer groups after a
showing that otherwise great hardship would be worked on both
groups. 48  Prices generally were arrived at with great difficulty,
and were usually of brief duration. Rapidly changing producers'
costs, and heavy fluctuations in the demand for milk in various
milk products industries were factors in the situation making for
unstable prices.
The Food Administration was much more active in respect to
controlling the prices of butter, cheese, and canned milk. Though
it disclaimed the power to fix and enforce prices, it did issue
numerous regulations attempting to control the maximum margins
of wholesalers and jobbers, manufacturers, and commission mer-
chants, and retailers of butter, 9 cheese,5 0 and canned milk."
Thus, though this attempted control of margins represented only
a partial control of price to the consumer, since it did not control
the price asked by the producer, it did have the price in a strait-
jacket once it left the producer, if enforced.
C. Post-War Period.-With the close of the War, the Food
Administration came to an end. Men continued to talk and write
about the milk industry as a business affected with a public inter-
est, and to plead for legalized monopoly. 2  But it had little effect
in the legislative halls, since the newspapers and public had turned
their attention elsewhere. The main development toward integra-
tion came from new and improved technical processes, study of
46(1917) Annual Report of the United States Food Administration,
Exhibit E, p. 24.
47Regional Milk Commissions were appointed for New York area,
Boston area, Chicago area, Philadelphia area, and Ohio area. One was
sought by consumers and producers in Oregon and Washington, but never
appointed. See Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk 1914-1918 pp.
127-136 for complete sketch of their activities.
48Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, p. 126.
49Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, pp. 115-123.50Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, pp. 123-125.5
'Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, pp. 125-126.
52Erdman, The Marketing of Whole Milk, (1921) ch. i, sec. 4, p. 13;
King, The Price of Milk, (1920) ch. 1, p. 15, part II, pp. 175-274.
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consumption,- 3 new machinery, milk tank cars, motorization, better
accounting systems, keener advertising, better sanitation, and finer
personnel. 4  It saw the growth of small local companies into
national ones, and brought the expansion of facilities and types of
products handled by processor-distributors. It witnessed the rise
of new milk producer cooperatives, and the growth and strength-
ening of old ones. Likewise the concept of collective bargaining
as a method of fixing prices and quantity of milk handled developed
from a theory to a practice. Government kept hands off of prices,
and business boomed.15
Considerable effort seems to have been devoted by cities, states,
railroads, and processor-distributors, as well as by some producers'
cooperatives, to the development of a bigger milkshed for metro-
politan markets.
5 6
In the early days metropolitan milksheds were geographically
small, and most of the large metropolitan markets were supplied
by intrastate milksheds 5 7  But by 1919 numerous urban markets
were supplied from milksheds extending over a number of states."
And up until 1930 this tendency grew, with the help of refrigerated
tank cars, homogenizers, and the demand.for cheap milk. 9 In fact,
so much so that in 1933 more than half the amount of fluid milk
consumed in New York City terminated on interstate rail move-
ment at railroad terminals in New Jersey."0
5 Ross, Some Factors Affecting the Demand for Milk and Cream in
the Metropolitan Area of New York, United States Dept. of Agriculture,
Technical Bulletin No. 73, June, 1928.54Kelly and Clement, Market Milk, (1923).
"Perhaps the raising of tariff walls had some effect on domestic prices.
See: Milk and Cream-Report of the United States Tariff Commission
to the President of the United States, with Appendix, Proclamation by the
President (1929). Lininger, Dairy Products under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, (1934) 6.
56Catherwood, A Statistical Study of Milk Production for the New
York Market, published by Cornell -Univ. Agricultural Experiment Sta..
Ithaca, N. Y., April, 1931; Schoenfeld, Some Economic Aspects of the
Marketing of Milk and Cream in New England, U. S. Dept. of Agricul-
ture, circular no. 16, October, 1927.57Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, pp. 105-106.58Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, pp. 105-106.
Excellent diagrams of this movement to the New York, Philadelphia, Bos-
ton, Chicago, Washington, and Milwaukee markets are contained between
pp. 39-47 of MacNutt, The Modern Milk Problem, in Sanitation, Eco-
nomics, and Agriculture.59Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, April 10, 1933, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Table 6, p. 36;
Cassels, A Study of Milk Prices, Presented at the Department of Eco-
nomics of Harvard University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, March 30, 1934.6
°Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, April 10, 1933, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, at p. 38.
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D. Agricultural Adjustment Administration-Dairy Section.-
The price relationships from 1920 to 1934 encouraged expansion
of the dairy industry, and this brought about increased herds, as
illustrated by the fact that the number of cows and heifers two
years old and over in the United States kept for milk increased
from 22,330,000, on January 1, 1928, to 26,062,000 or over 13 per
cent, on January 1, 1934.61
From 1931 to March and April, 1933, the combined effects of
increased production and decreased demand sent dairy prices
gradually lower.62 Thus, a definite buyer's market was created,
and the producers clamored for legislation setting price minimums,
with the hope that they would thus be protected from the con-
sumers.
When the AAA was being considered by Congress in 1933,
dairy products were at first omitted, but mainly through the efforts
of the National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation,0 3 they
were included in the final draft of the act. A Dairy Section was
set up to administer the act, and various divisions were created.
The main effort at the start was toward solution of the market milk
problem.
In general, the AAA did not deal with prices, but concerned
itself with production. The theory of the government experts
was that if a scarcity of the supply of commodities coming to the
market could be produced, there would automatically be an in-
crease in price, since demand would remain relatively constant,
and hence the disproportion between the two would be lessened
with an attendant restoration of equality of bargaining between
buyers and sellers.
But in the case of milk and its products, the secretary of agri-
culture undertook a policy of outright price fixing. It was felt
that such a policy did not contravene the due process clause of the
fifth amendment because of the decision in the Nebbia Case.64
Fluid milk marketing agreements were arranged which set
forth full schedules of prices to be paid producers for Class I,
61Black, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 60.62Cassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices, (1937).
63Black, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 21-24. For a
different explanation see: Eastman, The New Deal and the Dairyman,(1933) 130 Amer. Agr. 297; Nebbia v. New York, (1934) 291 U. S.
502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469.
"
4Abel, Commodity Price Control: A comparative Study in Federal
Constitutions, (Submitted to Professor Thomas Reed Powell in fulfill-
ment of the requirements in the Constitutional Law Seminar, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Mass., May, 1937) pp. 198-199.
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Class II, and Class III milk-that is, milk consumed respectively
in the forms of fluid milk, of cream, and of butter, cheese and
other manufactured products. There was also a complete schedule
of prices for contracting distributors' sales, including a wholesale
price schedule, a price schedule to stores, and a retail price
schedule."
After the contracting producers and processor-distributors had
a:.proved the agreement,66 it was signed by the secretary of agri-
culture, and he issued licenses and set the day when the license and
agreement should become effective." By the end of 1933, fluid
milk marketing agreements and licenses were in effect in Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, Twin Cities, Baltimore, Knoxville, Evans-
ville, Des Moines, New Orleans, Boston, Alameda County (Oak-
land), Los Angeles, St. Louis, San Diego and Richmond. 8
These agreements differed considerably as to their details,
although practically all of them were attempted adaptations to the
market structure prevailing in the individual markets. Some had
a use plan of selling to dealers and a base-surplus plan of distribut-
ing proceeds to farmers. Others had cash-and-carry differentials
or pooling systems for equalizing surpluses between processor-
distributors.6 9
By December, 1933, serious doubts had been raised as to the
wisdom of many of the provisions of the agreements; one group
in the AAA held four things to be essential: (1) recognition of
farmers' cooperatives; (2) territorial limitations in whole milk
sheds; (3) production control; (4) the same price to everybody
(equalization). 7 The other group believed that low minimum
65Black, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 96. Is such
form of government resale price maintenance a socially desirable prac-
tice? See: Corey, The Crisis of the Middle Class, (1935). Cf. extent
of private resale price maintenance under the Anti-Trust Laws, McLaugh-
lin, Cases on the Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1933) 458-504.66The argument has been made that producers and distributors who
sign such agreements thereby estop themselves from legally attacking their
provisions. Wentworth, The Administration's Approach to the Fluid Milk
Industry, Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Convention, General
Sessions, International Association of Milk Dealers, Cleveland, Ohio (1934)
p. 87.67Black, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 100.68Lininger, Dairy Products Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
(1934) 32. Copies of agreements, licenses and terminations can be
found in Marketing Agreements, Licenses, and Codes of Fair Coipeti-
tion, U. S. Department of Agriculture, AAA, (1933-34).69Lininger, Dairy Products Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
(1934) 32-40.
7OLininger, Dairy Products Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
(1934) 42-44.
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wholesale and retail price fixing might well be a part of the pro-
gram of the AAA, but that above a low minimum resale price to
protect against predatory price cutting, the free play of competi-
tive forces (especially competing uses of milk) should determine
the price the consumer paid for milk.7
In addition, serious difficulties of enforcement had arisen."
By October 6, 1933, in the Chicago area alone, 112 persons and
firms had been ordered to show cause why their licenses should
not be suspended or revoked. 73 Like conditions prevailed in other
areas. Most of the violations had to do with resale prices. In
spite of the fact that the supreme court of the district of Columbia
had upheld the constitutionality of the AAA as respects milk
licenses, in Economy Dairy Co. v. Wallace (Milton-Beck v. Wal-
lace),7 4 neither the General Counsel of AAA nor the department
of justice pushed court prosecutions.75
In December, 1933, there was a shakeup in the Dairy Section,
and on January 8, 1934, a telegram was dispatched to all parties
to existing agreements announcing a change of policy, saying in
part:
"Concentration of future efforts will be upon establishment and
maintenance of proper prices to producers, as each market warrants
without attempting hereafter to establish or enforce complete
schedules of distributors' prices to consumers." '
On February 1, 1934, all existing agreements were terminated,
though licenses were to remain in effect. By March 17, 1934,
twelve new licenses had been approved. They provided for low
minimum resale prices, though in no instance were resale prices
fixed. Provision was made for milk to be sold to all distributors
on a classified use basis, and proceeds were to be returned to pro-
ducers at a pool price or blended, base-surplus price."
The divergence of opinion continued in the Dairy Section and
7'Lininger, Dairy Products Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
(1934) 44.72For an account of the part played by the Chicago gangster element
in this enforcement war read, Mallon, From Beer to Milk, (1934) 1
Today 11:10.
73Black, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 104.
74(D. C. 1933) 61 Wash. L. Rep. 633; see also Capital City Milk
Producers' Assn. v. Wallace, (D. C. 1933) 1 S. C. D. C. (N. S.) 135, par.
7078, C. C. H. Trade Reg. Ser.
75Wallace v. Dwyer, United -States district court for Mass. (1934)
unreported.
76Black. The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933) 117.
77Lininger, Dairy Products under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(1934) 77. For a sample license, see Appendix E, p. 479, Black, The
Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933).
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within the industry. 8 There were changes in the composition of
the Dairy Section, 79 and violations and court tests grew.80
The AAA took the position that the milk supply of the areas
under agreements and licenses was "in the current of interstate
commerce," even when it was intrastate milk which never left the
state in which it was produced, transported and sold, since the
price of the local milk was governed to a considerable extent by
that which was in motion to extra-state markets. And that the
price of this latter could not be effectively regulated without con-
trolling the former.
The fundamental postulate of the Dairy Section was that there
was only one milk market in the United States, and that it was
of nationwide extent. They denied that there were many dissociated
and localized centers which were unaffected by milk production and
prices in the others. They argued that milk which could not find
a consumer outlet in fluid form was sold to butter, cheese, evapor-
ated milk plants, etc., and that, therefore, fluid milk prices in any
given local market were within bounds controlled by the national
price of manufactured milk products.8 ' Hence, it was impossible
to attempt to control one (interstate) without controlling the other
(intrastate), and that since this was true the Dairy Section had
the right to issue licenses controlling both.
The Dairy Section, however, fared badly in the courts, and
federal courts held milk licenses, in Baltimore, 82 Boston, 8  Des
78Pickett, And Milk Still Boils, (1934) 127 Pacific Rural Press 483;
Mallon, The Cow Bolts the New Deal, (May 5, 1934) 1 Today (28): 6;
Lacy, What Dairymen Think of Production Control, (April 28, 1934)
106 Prairie Farmer 106 (9): 3; Hayward, The First Year in Milk Plan-
ning, (June, 1934) 22 Nation's Business (6): 29.79The personnel of the Dairy Section was pungently criticized in
The Impractical Experience of the AAA Dairy Dictatorship, compiled by
the National Cooperative Dairy Defense Committee, (1934) 127 Pacific
Rural Press 367.8oBlack, The Dairy Industry and the A. A. A. (1933), pp. 117-144.
8lCassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices proves this to be economically
true. Cf. Zapoleon, Farm Relief, Agricultural Prices and Tariffs, (1932)
40 J. Pol. Econ. 73 for a discussion of the interaction of prices between
different sections of a federal sovereignty.
A similar analysis of Canadian activity is given in: Fraser, Result
of Dominion and Provincial Attempts to Stabilize the Milk Industry, Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention, International Associa-
tion of Milk Dealers, Cleveland, Ohio (1934) 49.
82Royal Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, (D. Md. 1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 975.
83United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy Co., (D. Mass. 1935) 10 Fed.
Supp. 995. Court seems to suggest, although without so holding that due
process under the fifth amendment may prohibit price fixing by the federal
government even where the state would not be prohibited by the four-
teenth amendment.
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Moines, 4 Indianapolis, 5 Los Angeles,"" Oklahoma City,"7 Clii-
cago, 8 Tulsa, 9 and Louisville,90 to be invalid, although the Chicago
license was held good? 1
Factually these decisions were divided into two types: (1)
those in which milk was brought from a state where produced,
across a state line, and sold in a different state from that of origin,
(2) those in which milk produced within the state was purchased
by processor-distributors to supply a market within that state,
neither the production, milk, dealer, or transaction having any
extrastate situs except as to its economic effect on interstate com-
merce.
The courts held that under the first situation Congress by
virtue of the interstate commerce clause did not have the right
to regulate the purchase price of milk at its point of production,
since it did not constitute a regulation of transportation or inter-
state sales, but was a control of production with which the states
alone had the right to deal.
As regards the second situation, the courts with the exception
of United States v. Shissler92 held it to be typically a transaction
of intrastate commerce, and one to which the federal price fixing
power did not extend, regardless of its influence on interstate
transactions.
As a result of these decisions, the Department of Justice pro-
ceeded with caution, and avoided taking any of the cases to the
84United States v. Neuendorf (doing business as Hillcrest Dairy).(S. D. Iowa 1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 403.8 United States v. Greenwood Dairy Farms, Inc. (S. D. Ind. 1934) 8
Fed. Supp. 398.86Darger v. Hill, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) 76 Fed. (2d) 198. See opinion
in Hill v. Darger, (S.D. Cal. 1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 189. Berdie v. Kurtz,
(C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1935) 75 Fed. (2d) 898. Note 3 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
494 (1935).87Douglas v. Wallace, (W. D. Okla. 1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 379.
88 Columbus Milk Producers Cooperative Ass'n v. Wallace (N. D. Ill.
1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 1014. In this case and in the Seven Oaks Case we
have a situation in which had the state attempted to regulate the price to
be paid, it would have been a regulation of interstate commerce and for-
bidden.. When the federal government tried to do it, it was a regulation of
production and forbidden. Edgewater Dairy Co. et al v. Wallace, (N.D.
Ill. 1934) 7 Fed. Supp. 121, appeal dismissed in (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1935) 75
F. (2d) 1022.89Allen v. Wallace, (N. D. Okla. 1935) 12 Fed. Supp. 515.90Mellwood Dairy v. Sparks, (W. D. Ky. 1934), par. 7192, C. C. H.
Trade Regulation Service, reversed on procedural grounds in (C. C. A. 6th
Cir. 1934) 74 Fed. (2d) 695.91United States v. Shissler, (N. D. Ill. 1934) 7 Fed. Supp. 123. See
comments (1934) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 86; (1934) 9 Temp. L. Q. 95.
92Note 90.
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United States Supreme Court 9 3 especially in view of the Schechter
decision, 94 which many persons thought would affect the AAA.
The AAA refused to accept such a conclusion, and speedily
set about devising amendments to meet the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements against undue delegation of powers and against ex-
tension of federal control under the commerce clause to include
transactions only indirectly affecting interstate commerce.
The amendments were passed on August 24, 1935. 9 "Orders"
by the secretary of agriculture were substituted for licensing pro-
visions of the original act, and a "reserve clause" was inserted, en-
abling the AAA to compel any distributor to accept an "order"
favored by two-thirds of the producers. The practical effect of
this was to allow producers and dealers to get together and bargain
collectively. The only difference from the previous procedure was
that dealers were allowed to bargain as a group without the theo-
retical threat of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws.
In United States v. David Buttrick Co.,"0 Judge Brewster,
relying on United States v. Butler,9 7 held that the entire AAA had
been declared unconstitutional in the Butler Case, and, therefore,
there was no statute under which the secretary of agriculture could
issue "orders" regulating the marketing of milk.
As a result of this case, Order No. 4 in the Boston area was
suspended and the Dairy Section became for a time primarily an
academic body. Then partly as a result of Judge Brewster's cryptic
opinion, and for other reasons,98 Congress amended and reenacted
the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, relating to
marketing agreements and orders.99 The purpose of the legisla-
tion was to separate clearly the marketing provisions of the AAA
from the production-control program and to say as clearly as it
was within the power of Congress to do so, that the marketing
93See: (1934) New York, Attorney General's Report 319, where John
J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney General, in an opinion held that the licensing
power of the secretary of agriculture did not oust the state of New York
from control over intrastate milk transactions, and that the state could en-
force health regulations as to milk when as to those transactions involving
interstate commerce.94Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S.
495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570. Cf. United States v. Sutherland
(W.D. Mo. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 204 for its language on price fixing.
9548 Stat. at L. 31 et seq., 7 U. S. C. A. 601 et seq.
96(D. Mass. 1936) 15 Fed. Supp. 655. But see: AAA Release 1228-36
of January 8, 1936.
97(1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 102 A. L. R. 914.98See: Senate Report No. 565 to accompany H. R. 5722, May 13, 1937,
and House Report No. 468 to accompany H. R. 5722, March 24, 1937.
997 U. S. C. A. 671 et seq. (May, 1937).
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agreements and orders were not for the purpose of controlling
the production of any agricultural commodity.
Before anything could be done under this, however, the First
circuit court of appeals in United States v. David Buttrick Co.100
reversed the district court, and held that the United States district
court had jurisdiction to decree compliance with Order 4, since
marketing agreement and order provisions of the AAA as amended
in 1935 were not intended to, and did not effect a regulation and
control of agricultural production. The court said that as long
as the AAA orders merely regulated the purchase, distribution and
sale of milk in the current of interstate commerce, they were valid
and would be enforced by the courts.101
Thus, in the light of what the courts have decided to date, it
is probably safe to say that the federal structure of the government
will still act as a deterrent to any natural control of local produc-
tion or intrastate marketing.10 2  In addition it would seem that
the due process clause is still operative to the extent of preventing
unreasonable, extraordinary and arbitrary fixing of prices of
milk and its products. 03
100(C. C. A., 1st Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 66. Petition for writ of
certiorari denied in (1937) 58 Sup. Ct. 140, 82 L Ed. 103. Cf. the language
in Edwards v. ,United States (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 767, and
United States v. Whittenberg, (S. D. Texas, 1938) 21 F. Supp. 713 in
which under the same marketing provisions of the AAA, orders of the sec-
retary of agriculture regulating the marketing of citrus fruit were upheld
as being a valid exercise of Congress' power over agricultural products in
the current of interstate commerce, as long as they only affected inter-
state production and sale. Accord: United States v. Whiting Milk Co.,
(D. C. Mass. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 321.1010rder 4 was reinstated and hearings arranged. See: order of sec-
retary of agriculture issued on June 25, 1937 (mimeographed). It is
interesting to note that the effect of the order was avoided by the proces-
sor-distributors by arranging contracts with the producers whereby the
former became the agents to make sales for the latter, title to the milk
remaining in the producer.
1O2But if the federal government can control the production of steel,
trailers, and clothes, why not the production of milk? Is there any reason
for stressing the individual steps in the production and marketing of agri-
cultural commodities and refusing to view it as a connected routine, while
at the same time accepting the production and marketing of industrial
commodities as an integrated process subject to control by the federal gov-
ernment because national in scope?
'
03For an excellent analysis and digest of all the federal cases on the
dairy provisions of AAA see Tobey, Federal and State Control of Milk
Prices, Int. Ass'n of Milk Dealers (1937).
Abel, Commodity Price Control: A Comparative Study in Federal
Constitutions, (Submitted to Professor Thomas Reed Powell in fulfillment
of the requirements in the Constitutional Law Seminar, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Mass., May, 1937) 31 et seq. has carefully considered
all the cases dealing with determination of prices by government and has
concluded that there is no due process limitation on reasonable price fixing.
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The AAA was a further evidence of government paternalism
towards agriculture which had earlier been evidenced by the
Capper-Volstead Act and its predecessors. It was basically a
system designed to further cooperative marketing 0 4-by govern-
ment compulsions if necessary. Thus, it was a logical development
of the old tendency to exclude certain agricultural groups from the
operation of the Anti-Trust Laws. It was truly an anomalous
situation in many respects--chiefly, since it witnessed an attempt
by the government to benefit economically one group at the ex-
pense of various other groups-mainly consumers and middle-
men.
105
The failures of the Dairy Section have been due to many
causes. They lacked the proper personnel to start with, and tried
to work too fast, with the result that they alienated public opinion
as well as large sections of the industry. 10 In addition, they soon
learned that producers' cooperatives could not be depended on to
support the general welfare, but were interested only in their nar-
row and selfish ends.10 7 Worse than all this, they lacked trained
economists, accountants and lawyers of ability, steeped in the lore
of the milk business and commanded by executives of large vision,
with a knack for dealing with people. Nor was any comprehensive
effort ever made to control prices based on analyzed knowledge
of all the factors. Such things as market zones, feed costs, invest-
ment return, sanitary costs, product divides, transportation costs,
marketing and processing costs, volume of supply and demand,
etc., were either ignored or mostly guessed at. When we add
to this the price harpooning of a large recalcitrant group of
producer-distributors" 8 we can see that the Dairy Section was
doomed to failure in any attempt to produce a nationally work-
able dairy program.
But, were none of these things true, the regulation of the prices
of milk and milk products by the AAA is destined to be unsuccess-
ful as long as they fail to control all production and marketing,109
and as long as the courts persist in their present views, the AAA
will be unable to control intrastate production and marketing even
104Wallace, The Dairy Dilemma, (1934) (mimeographed), p. 12.
105Cf. the recent ineffective protests of consumer groups in New York
City as to the rising cost of milk. The Milk Dealer (July, 1937).lOoWallace, The Dairy Dilemma, (1934) (mimeographed), p. 9.
1O7Wallace, The Dairy Dilemma, (1934) (mimeographed), pp. 2-4.
108Agricultural Adjustment, a Report of Administration of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, May, 1933, to February, 1934. United States
Dept. of Agriculture p. 165.
10oWallace, The Dairy Dilemma, (1934) (mimeographed) p. 17 et seq.
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though it does "affect" national regulation. Hence, unless there
is "national-state cooperation" by some method, or constitutional
change, federal regulation will not be possible, aside from the
question of its desirability and possibility of economic workability.
E. State Control.110-From an early date, states had laws pro-
viding for public health control of milk and milk products, but it
was not until 1933 with the advent of milk strikes"1 1 on a large
scale that the first state law was passed providing for price con-
trol." 2 However, as early as 1910 the attorney general of New
York had recommended such legislation to the legislature.1 '
Thereafter, in rapid succession 24 states in all"1 ' passed milk
control laws, while governors vetoed such laws in three states,"'
and in ten states' 1  legislatures rejected them. On January 1,
1937, one survey indicated that twenty-one states had legislation.117
"10 For an excellent consideration of the legal bases of state price
control over milk and milk products, see: Cross, Legal Aspects of Milk
Control, p. 271 of Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate
the Milk Industry, April 10, 1933, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114. Com-
pare with this the briefs filed in Nebbia v. New York, (1934) 291 U. S.
502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469. Also see: Manrey,
Constitutionality of Regulating Milk as a Public Utility, (1933) 18 Cornell
L. Q. 410; Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, (1930) 39 Yale
L. J. 1089; Culver, Milk-a Public Utility: a reading list, Jan. 1, 1934, 12
pp. (mimeo.) Berkeley, Bureau of Public Adm., Univ. of California;
Cootsworth, Milk Marketing as a Public Utility, (Mar.-Apr., 1933) 7
Coop. Mark. Jour. (2) 44; McMillen, Milk-a Public Utility, (1934) 58
Country Home 10.
For an earlier and somewhat more Holmesian approach see: King,
Public Interest in Milk Distribution, supra, pp. 274-290. It is to be noted
that lawyers have ignored the wealth of empirical materials that could be
worked into briefs such as those collected in The Dairy Industry in the
United States, 1932-Sept. 1934, compiled by Margaret Harrison, Librarian,
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture.
2"'New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Chicago were so affected as
well as many other milksheds. Wilson, the Milk Strike, (1933) 76 New
Republic 122 (New York situation); Lynch, Longest Milk Strike in His-
tory, (1933) 7 Coop. Mark. Jour. (1) : 8 (St. Louis situation) ; Holt, The
Chicago Milk Strike, (Feb. 1934) 12 Rural Amer. (2): 5; Harris, The
Battle of the Milksheds, (Nov. 1933) 39 Current Hist. (2) : 191.
"l2Wisconsin: Black, The Milk Industry and the A. A. A. 311.
"'3Report to the Legislature in the Matter of Milk Investigation, 1910
by Edward R. O'Malley, Attorney General of N. Y.
1141n order of passage: Wisconsin, New York, New Jersey, Connec-
ticut, Ohio, Florida, Vermont, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, Vir-
ginia, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Alabama,
California, Indiana, Maihie, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, and
South Dakota. Black, The Milk Industry and the A. A. A. 312.
"'Illinois, Michigan, and Louisiana.
2"6Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, and Tennessee.
"'.Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Wisconsin, pp. 5-7, Analysis of State Milk Control Laws,
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The laws in general provide for some administrative board,
but the number of members on them varied considerably. They
were pretty uniformly appointed by the governor and for vary-
ing terms. Remuneration provided varied from nothing to $8,000
a year. In many cases bonds were required. Producers, proces-
sor-distributors, consumers, and the state were usually represented
on the boards."18
They had the power to supervise and regulate fluid milk, in-
vestigate, mediate, and arbitrate, right of entry, and could often
designate marketing areas. As to prices, they could as a rule
fix prices paid to producers and regulate wholesale and retail
prices. In some cases they could fix a surplus price. License
fees of a sliding scale nature were imposed variously on producers,
producer-distributors, dealers or distributors, -and processors,
usually for the purpose of supporting the work of the admin-
istrative board. In a few states there were strict requirements as
to keeping of records and accounting practices, while some required
bonds from distributors for the protection of producers.'"
These milk control laws soon found themselves in the courts. 120
by Dorothy Campbell Culver; Bureau of Public Administration, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, Jan. 4, 1937 (Report to California Legislature).
Cf. Brief Summary of Information Concerning State Milk Control Agencies,
October 31, 1936, prepared by state of Connecticut Milk Administrator
(mimeographed).
I have not gone into this state milk control legislation, since it is
beyond the scope of this article to do more than sketch it. However, none
of the compilations seem to be very accurate, since it is very difficult to
ascertain the exact status of the legislation in various states due to legis-
lative, administrative, and court changes. For example, the above survey
shows Texas with an effective state control law in January, 1937. In
fact, this law was held invalid in 1934. State v. Hall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
76 S. W. (2d) 880, writ of error dismissed, and Mading's Drug Stores,
Inc. v. Blanton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 78 S. W. (2d) 1036, writ of error
dismissed, both holding the Texas Milk Control Act, (Gen. and Sp. Laws,
43d Leg. 2d Called Sess. p. 56, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. ch. 19, art. 165-1)
unconstitutional. See: Report of the Committee to Investigate the Dairy
Industry, House Journal, Texas Legislature, 44th Leg. 2d Called Sess.
616, 620.
The most complete digest and discussion of state milk control laws,
cases and administrative set up is to be found in Series on State Milk
Control Acts issued by the Dairy Section, AAA, of which thirteen papers
had been issued on March 31, 1938. See also Comment (1937) 14 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 375, n. 1, and Tobey, Legal Aspects of Milk Control,
International Ass'n of Milk Dealers (1936).
118 Culver, Analysis of State Milk Control Laws, supra, pp. 5-8.
119 Culver, Analysis of State Milk Control Laws, supra, pp. 9-24.
120 Tobey, Federal and State Control of Milk Prices, International Asso-
ciation of Milk Dealers (1937) and Miller, Legal Aspects of Milk Control
Laws, Northeastern Dairy Conference, New York City (1937) (mimeo.)
contain thoroughgoing discussions of the more important state decisions.
For a milkman-economist discussion of some of these cases see Corbett,
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Nebbia v. New York' 21 was the first case involving the consti-
tutionality of a state milk control law to reach the United States
Supreme Court. The court upheld the right of the legislature of
New York to pass such a law fixing milk prices, and held the test
to be "whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation
as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it
as arbitrary or discriminatory."1 2  The old basis of determination
-"is it affected with a public interest ?"-was abandoned. In the
subsequent case of Highland Farm Dairy v. J. S. Agnew, 23 the
A Review of Federal and State Milk Control Experience, Extension Serv-
ice, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, (1934) and Black, The Milk Industry
and the A. A. A. pp. 276-277, 292-293, 313-317, and 332.
121(1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R.
1469. Notice that the New York Legislature allowed article 21-R, which
provided for price fixing to lapse on April 1, 1937, N. Y. Times, April 2,
1937, p. 1, col. 7.
Expressing Approval: Hirth, The New York Milk Case, (1934)
26 Mo. Farmer 102 (gives a farmer's view approving) ; Cassels, The Fluid
Milk Program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, (1935) 43
J. Pol. Econ. 482; McClellan, Can a State Regulate Prices of a Private
Industry?, (1934) 9 Ind. L. J. 522; Whele, "Due Process" and price control
under the Supreme Court's "Milk Decision." (1934) 125 Publishers' Weekly
1351, expressing strong approval; Bauer, The Courts Approve Milk Price
Fixing, (1933) 22 Nat. Mun. Rev. 588; Cohen, Milk Regulation: A Problem
in Economics, Legislation, and Administration, (1934) 40 W. Va. L Q.
247; Comments and Notes, (1934) 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 325; (1934) 8 Tulane
L. Rev. 442; (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 887; (1934) 2 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 402;
(1934) 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 202; (1934) 8 St. John L. Rev. 355; (1934)
82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 619; (1934) 14 B. U. L. R. 396; (1934) 9 Notre Dame
Lawyer 468 (especially enthusiastic approval); (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev.
832; (1934) 19 Iowa L. Rev. 557; (1934) 23 Ill. B. J. 89; (1934) 1 L. J.
Student Bar Ass'n Ohio State Univ. 29; (1933) 13 B. U. L. Rev. 697.
Noncommital Comments and Notes: (1934) 20 Va. L, Rev. 700;
(1934) 8 Temp. L. Q. 426; (1934) 2 Geo. L. J. 604; (1934) 18 Marq.
L. Rev. 198; (1934) 18 MINNESOTA LAw REnEw 874; (1934) 20 A. B.
A. J. 225.
Unfavorable: Note (1934) 4 Detroit L. Rev. 167.
122For a cogent argument that the United States Supreme Court in
upholding the constitutionality of the New York law did so on the basis
of the fact that it was a temporary means of coping with a devastating
emergency problem, see Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate the Milk Control Law, State of New York, Legislative Docu-
ment (1937) No. 81, pp. 17-19.
Wynne, Analysis of Milk Control in New York State, (March, 1937)
26 The Milk Dealer 6:62 gives a penetrating discussion of why the legis-
lation failed.
123(1937) 300 U. S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L. Ed. 514. The opinion
of the district court, Highland Farms Dairy v. Aguew (E. D. Va. 1936)
16 F. Supp. 575 is well worth reading. Loss of this case failed to deter
the Highland Farms Dairy from accepting orders to deliver milk in the
Arlington-Alexandria area of Virginia at prices below those fixed by the
state board. The company advises Virginia residents to send their orders
by mail to the Washington office, whereupon deliveries are made in the
usual manner at 11 cents per quart against the state price of 14 cents.
Sales in Highland retail stores are at the higher price. Dairy Produce,
August 16, 1937, p. 24, col. 2.
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court through Mr. Justice Cardozo sustained the constitutionality
of a similar law in Virginia.
Many state courts passed on the validity of such legislation,
and most of them found their legislation constitutional.' 1  After
the initial problem of whether a state legislature could fix the price
of milk through a state control board had been determined,
12 5
numerous other subsidiary questions under such laws occupied
the attention of the courts."2 6 Chief among these was the ques-
tion of allowable price differentials. The United States Supreme
Court supported the designation of a minimum price to be paid
producers, 127 and upheld a provision of the New York Milk Control
Act allowing a differential of one cent per quart in favor of deal-
ers "not having a well advertised trade name,"1 8 but refused to
allow the benefit of such differential to be limited to distributors
who entered the milk business before April 10, 1933.129 In another
124Miami Home Milk Producers Association v. Milk Control Board,
(1936) 124 Fla. 797, 169 So. 541. Logan v. Alfieri, (1933) 110 Fla. 439,
148 So. 872; Franklin v. State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control Board,
(1936) 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295; Albert v. Milk Control Board, (Ind.
1936) 200 N. E. 688; State Board of Milk Control v. Richman Ice Cream
Co., (1934) 117 N. J. E. 296, 175 Ati. 796; State ex rel. State Board
of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., (1933) 118 N. J. E. 504, 179 Atl.
116; Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, (1936) 332 Pa. St. 257, 186 Atd.
336; State ex rel. Finnegan v. Lincoln Dairy Co., (1936) 221 Wis. 1, 265
N. W. 197, 851.
125Griffiths et al. v. Robinson, (1935) 181 Wash. 438, 43 P. (2d) 977;
(invalid delegation of power but containing dicta that it might be invalid
on due process grounds). State v. Hall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 76 S. W.
(2d) 880, writ of error dismissed; Mading's Drug Stores, Inc., v. Blan-
ton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 78 S. W. (2d) 1036, writ of error dismissed.
The Maryland statute was held invalid as improperly delegating legis-
lative power to an administrative board. Maryland Co-operative Milk
Producers, Inc. v. Miller, (1936) 170 Md. 81, 182 At. 432, the court
expressly reserving decision as to whether it violated any of the pro-
visions of the Maryland constitution similar to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
126Grandview Dairy v. Baldwin, (1934) 239 App. Div. 640, 269 N. Y.
S. 116; Baldwin v. Dellwood Dairy Co., (1934) 150 Misc. Rep. 762, 270
N. Y. S. 418; State v. Old Tavern Farm, (1935) 133 Me. 468, 180 Ati. 473;
Contra: People v. Perretta, (1930) 253 N. Y. 306, 171 N. E. 72; Eisen-
berg Farms v. Baldwin, (1934) 285 N. Y. 662, 193 N. E. 434; Muller
Dairies v. Baldwin, (1934) 242 App. Div. 296; 274 N. Y. S. 975; People
ex rel. McDonough v. Bratowsky, (1934) 154 Misc. Rep. 432, 276 N. Y.
S. 418.
127Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, (1934) 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup.
Ct. 7, 79 L. Ed. 259, (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 33.
128Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Ten Eyck, (1936) 297 U. S.
251, 56 Sup. Ct. 453, 80 L. Ed. 669; (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 996; cf.
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, (1934) 293 U. S. 194, 55 Sup. Ct.
187, 79 L. Ed. 281; Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 631.
129Mayflower Farms, Inc., v. Ten Eyck, (1936) 297 U. S. 266, 56
Sup. Ct. 457, 80 L. Ed. 675, (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 996.
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case, Baldwin v. Seelig,130 the United States Supreme Court held
invalid a refusal of the New York Milk Control Board to license
a distributor who would not pay Vermont producers the price set
by the board. This would seem to prevent any effective state con-
trol of milk imports, and makes resale price maintenance difficult.
After the decision of the Nebbia Case as to the limitations of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the problem
decided in the Seelig Case was bound to arise. By it the scope
of state action in regulating milk prices was defined, and today a
state cannot apply its milk price fixing laws to milk coming from
or going to a place beyond its borders. In other words, it is
just a reannouncement that a state cannot interfere with inter-
state commerce.
The total effect of the decision in the Seelig Case is to render
nugatory any single state price control measures standing alone,
since the prices of fluid milk and manufactured milk flowing in
the channels of interstate commerce will be sufficient to upset the
price control efforts of any one state.
Hence, if it is wise to persist in efforts at state regulation,
some new technique must be found.
On the whole, state control schemes were not very successful
in doing more than affording temporary stabilization. They were,
as a rule, very much in local politics, and were manned by incom-
petent forces. As a rule, they were jealous of their prerogatives,
and did not cooperate very well with other state boards or with
the Dairy Section of the AAA.
F. Present Conditions.-The Congress of the United States,
after an investigation into the milk industry in the District of
Columbia, 3' got excited about monopolistic conditions in the milk
industry and about the relationship between milk producers' co-
operatives and milk distributors, and in May, 1934 ordered the
Federal Trade Commission to make an investigation into the sale
and distribution of milk and other dairy products.3
2
1o(1935) 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032; (1935)
48 Harv. L. Rev. 1437. The Yale Law Journal guessed wrong on this
type of situation. Legislative Regulation of the New York Dairy Indus-
try, comment (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1259, 1268. Comments: (1935) 19
MiNNsorA LAw Rvmw 796; (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rev. 500; (1935) 10 Wis.
L. Rev. 388.
'
3
'Sale and Distribution of Dairy Products in the District of Colum-
bia, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the District of
Columbia, United States Senate, Seventy-third Congress, second session.
pursuant to S. Res. 76, Aug. 15-Dec. 18, 1933, 2 pts. Washington, U. S.
Govt. Print. Off. (1933).
'
32House Concurrent Resolution 32 (73rd Cong., 2d Sess.) For a
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In compliance with this, the Federal Trade Commission has
investigated and reported on the Connecticut and Philadelphia
milksheds,133 the Chicago sales area,1 3 4 the Boston, Baltimore, St.
Louis, and Cincinnati milksheds,131 the Twin City sales area, 1 0
and the New York milk sales area,'3 7 and has transmitted a sum-
mary of their investigations to Congress.' 38 In connection with
another Congressional direction 39 they have made an implement-
ing report. 40
These reports (which seem to be haphazard surface findings,
rather than a thoroughgoing analysis) show that the dominating
tendencies in the milk industry are toward centralization of process-
ing and distributing in fewer hands, organization of milk pro-
ducers into cooperative associations, and widening of collective
bargaining between the two.
The integration of processor-distributing facilities has largely
come about through acquisition of the principal independent dis-
tributors in large metropolitan centers by a few holding companies.
The acquisition resulted either from purchase of stock control or
assets, usually the former.
The largest of these national holding companies is National
Dairy Products Corporation. It was organized in 1923, and has
acquired either directly or indirectly the business of 358 indi-
viduals, firms, or corporations engaged in practically all branches
recent brimstone charge of monopoly directed against the large milk pro-
cess-distributors see Congressman Francis D. Culkin's talk at the Boon-
ville (N.Y.) County Fair. (September 1, 1937) 84 American Creamery
and Poultry Produce Review (11) : 580 Col. 2.
133Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Dis-
tribution of Milk Products-Connecticut and Philadelphia Milksheds,
(1935); Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Dis-
tribution of Milk Products-Connecticut and Philadelphia Milksheds, (1936).
134Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distribu-
tion of Milk and Milk Products-Chicago Sales area, (1936).
"'5Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936).
130Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-Twin City Sales Area, (1936).
"'7Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937).
"38Federal Trade Commission Summary Report on Conditions with
respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products, sub-
mitted to Congress Jan. 4, 1937.
139 Public Resolution No. 61, 74th Congress, 1st Session.
140Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Agricultural Income(printed copies of the Report are not available since the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee has not ordered it printed). Pre-
sented to Congress on March 2, 1937. Mimeographed summary by Federal
Trade Commission is available.
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of the dairy industry.14' It is particularly interested in fluid milk,
ice cream and cheese. The states in which its business is most
heavily concentrated are: New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio,
Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.
Among its subsidiaries handling fluid milk is the largest distributor
in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, and Cleve-
land.3
42
At the end of 1932 the total assets of the company were $210,-
000,000, including goodwill valued at $22,400,000. In 1930 the
total sales were $374,500,000. Net profits in 1932 were $12,500,-
000, or 6.0 per cent on the total capital. About one-third of its
capital is in the form of capital stock and surplus. Bonded
indebtedness accounts for 35 per cent of the total liabilities and
net worth; preferred stock for 5.6 per cent. At the end of 1932
there were "in excess of 65,000" stockholders.14 3
During 1934, subsidiaries of National Dairy Products Cor-
poration purchased 3,727,942,292 pounds of fluid milk, equivalent
to 11.2 per cent of all the wholesale milk sold by farmers in the
United States. It purchased 19.1 per cent of all the milk sold on
the market by all dairy farmers in the states of Vermont, New
York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. It controls
39.3 per cent of the milk sold in Hartford, 30.5 per cent of the
milk sold in New Haven, and 14.7 in the entire state of Connecti-
cut. It sells approximately 55 per cent of the Baltimore supply.
1
,
4
Through its acquisition of the Hydrox Corporation, Breyer
Ice Cream Co., General Ice Cream Co., and many smaller com-
panies, it in 1934 manufactured and sold 37,550,988 gallons of
ice cream, equal to 21.38 per cent of the total quantity of ice
cream manufactured for sale in the United States."4 ' Control of
Breakstone Bros., Inc., and of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation
gave it one-third of the cheese business in the United States.1 48
'
4
'Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)
77-114. A list of these companies is contained in Table 4, Appendix, pp.
125-138.
'
42Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933, p. 178.
143Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933, pp. 178-179.
144Federal Trade Commission Summary Report on Conditions with
Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products, sub-
mitted to Congress Jan. 4, 1937, pp. 9-10.
145Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937) 4.
'"Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937) 5.
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During 1935, forty-eight executives of National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corporation and its subsidiaries received salaries of $15,000
or more per year. Their total salaries amounted to $1,229,974.37,
at an average of $25,624.46 each. Seventeen received $25,000 or
more each; three received more than $60,000 each; and the
president of the corporation received $108,000.14T
The second largest milk and dairy products company in the
United States is the Borden Company. The business had its
beginning in 1857 when Gail Borden originated "condensed milk."
The present company was organized and incorporated in 1899
under the name of Borden's Condensed Milk Co. The corporate
name was changed to The Borden Co. on October 29, 1919. At
the end of 1927 there were 35 subsidiaries, operating under the
parent company. 48 Beginning in 1928, the company initiated a
policy of expansion through acquisition and consolidation of com-
panies engaged in various branches of the dairy industry. During
the five-year period 1928-1932, the Borden Co. acquired directly or
indirectly through its subsidiaries 207 companies. The company
was reorganized in January, 1936, and became an operating com-
pany by taking over the business of all excepting ten of its
operating subsidiaries. The companies taken over in 1936 are
now operating divisions of The Borden Company. 49
The capitalization of the company on December 31, 1932, was
$158,793,000. This includes goodwill valued at $7,000,000. Sales
in 1932 amounted to $212,349,000. Net income for 1932 was
$7,524,000, or 4.7 per cent of the capitalization at the end of
the year. Ownership of the stock at the end of 1932 was dis-
tributed among 36,000 stockholders."
Borden's does business in fluid milk, butter, cheese, ice cream,
eggs, cream, condensed milk, evaporated milk, powdered milk,
malted milk, casein products, caramels, mince meat, dried fruit
juices, etc.151 During 1934 the Borden Company and its sub-
sidiaries purchased 5,183,239,000 pounds of fluid milk and milk
147Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937) 6.
14SReport of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)
56-58.
14DReport of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)
58 and Table 3, Appendix, pp. 120-125.
1sOReport of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933, p. 177.
15 lReport of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933, p. 177.
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equivalent in other dairy products, such as cream, butter, and
cheese, equivalent to 6.8 per cent of the total commercial milk
sold from farms in the United States. In June, 1934, they
controlled 33.5 per cent of the milk business in Bridgeport and 7.9
per cent in Connecticut. In June, 1935, they sold 21 per cent of
the total fluid milk in Chicago."5 2 Their business is mainly con-
centrated in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and in the Provinces of Ontario and
Quebec in Canada. They distribute produce in every state of the
union and in foreign countries.15 3
Salaries received by thirty-five officials of The Borden Co.
and its subsidiaries, who received salaries of $15,000 or over
during 1935, amounted to $960,044, or an average of $27,430
each. Twenty-two of the thirty-five officers received $20,000 or
more each, and the president received $95,000.154
The third largest milk and milk products holding company in
the United States is the United States Dairy Products Corpora-
tion. It was organized under the laws of Maryland on December
28, 1922. It had acquired 50 companies by 1935, and was oper-
ating in Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, New
Jersey, Virginia, Florida, and Michigan. By 1935 it had filed
a petition under 77-B of the Bankruptcy Law, and was being oper-
ated by trustees appointed by the United States district court at
Baltimore. 55
The Federal Trade Commission has indicated that it is strongly
opposed to the merger, consolidation, or bringing under one
ownership or control of formerly competing enterprises, and has
recommended to Congress that sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton
Act be amended to achieve the desired results. They would
amend it to prohibit the acquisition by one corporation or person
of the stock or assets of any person or corporation engaged in
152Federal Trade Commission Summary Report on Conditions with
Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products, sub-
mitted to Congress Jan. 4, 1937, pp. 10-11.
'
53Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the
Milk Industry, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933. p. 177.
'
54Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)
p. 6.
155Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk Products-Connecticut and Philadelphia Milksheds, (1935)
p. 44.
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the same or similar lines of business (prevent vertical expan-
sion) .'
The Federal Trade Commission reports show the following
milk producers' cooperatives to be outstanding in the areas cov-
ered :167
1. PHILADELPHIA.
a. Intcr-State Milk Producers' Association.'" In 1935 it had
approximately 22,000 producer-members drawn from the states of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and West Vir-
ginia, who produce 80 per cent of the milk in that area.
2. CONNECTICUT.
a. Connecticut Milk Producers' Association. 11 In 1935 it had
a membership of about 2,760 farmers producing 50 per cent of
all the milk in the state.
3. NEW YORK.
a. Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, Inc.6 0 It had
in 1935 about 37,500 active producer members. It processes milk
in addition to marketing it. Approximately 50 per cent of the
milk produced by members is handled through plants owned by the
association. The balance is delivered to distributors.
b. Sheffield Producers' Cooperative Association, Inc.'0 t In
1936 it had approximately 15,000 dairy farmers as members. It
supplies milk only to Sheffield Farms Co., Inc., a subsidiary of
National Dairy Products Corporation, distributing milk in the
New York metropolitan area.
4. BOSTON.
a. New England Milk Producers' Association.' 2 During 1935
15GAgricultural Income Summary, supra, pp. 17-18.
157 The Agricultural Income Summary shows that milk cooperatives
have a total membership of 750,000 and handle one-third of the total
cooperative marketing business in the -United States.
1"Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk Products-Connecticut and Philadelphia Milksheds, (1935)
p. 2.
159 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk Products-Connecticut and Philadelphia Milksheds, (1935)
p. 2.
loOReport of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)
p. 2.
'
6 1 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-New York Milk Sales Area, (1937)p. 2.
6 2Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) p. 1.
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it had a membership of over 20,000, only 4,000 of whom are
located in Massachusetts. It controls 70 per cent of the Boston
milk supply.
5. BALTIMORE.
a. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc.'6 3 In 1935 it
had about 3,400 producer members, and controlled the bulk of
the milk going into the Baltimore sales area.
6. CINCINNATI.
a. The Cooperative Pure Milk Association.6 4 This is in
effect a holding company which owns all of the common stock of
French-Bauer, Inc., the Ritz-American Ice Cream Co., both located
in Cincinnati, and of Kentucky Dairies, Inc., of Louisville, Ky.
The members decreased from 3,300 in 1924 to 1,900 in 1935.
This association is the largest distributor of milk in Cincinnati.
In 1935 it shipped 59,897,467 pounds.
b. The K. 1. 0. Milk Producers Association."' In November,
1934, it had a membership of 1,058. In 1935 it shipped 45,339,100
pounds.
c. The Milk Producers' Union, Inc."68 In February, 1936, it had
about 1,600 members. In December, 1935, it shipped 3,269,201
pounds of milk.
7. ST. Louis.
a. Sanitary Milk Producers, Inc.6 7 It acts as sales agent for
approximately 12,900 members, and claims to control 70 per cent
of the milk shipped to St. Louis.
8. CHICAGO.
a. Pure Milk Association. 68  On March 7, 1935, it had a
membership of 16,983 dairy farmers in Wisconsin, Illinois, and
163Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) p. 2.
164Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) pp. 63-67.
165Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) pp. 67-69.
'66Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) p. 69.
167Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Distribution and
Sale of Milk and Milk Products-Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis
(1936) pp. 94-95.
'
68Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-Chicago Sales Area, (1936) p. 2.
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Indiana. It has sales agreements with distributors who sell ap.
proximately 72 per cent of all fluid milk sold in Chicago.
9. MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. PAUL.
a. Twin City Milk Producers Association.169 It has over 8,000
milk producer members, and supplies about 85 per cent of the
fluid milk requirements of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In 1935
the association itself processed 48.1 per cent of the milk handled
into various products.
Although there was only slight evidence to support the fear
of Congress that "there exists a close tie between certain leaders
of milk producers' cooperatives and milk distributors," there was
substantial evidence that cooperative organizations and large
milk dealers through agreement had fixed the prices to be paid
by consumers. ° The reports rather clearly indicate that if there
is no government regulation, and if milk producers' cooperatives
continue to be excluded from the operation of the state and federal
anti-trust laws, the natural result will be increased prices to the
consumer, which increase will to a considerable extent go to the
producers. Of course there is some doubt how far economic con-
ditions in the United States will allow them to take this.1 7'
One of the most interesting things about the reports is the
evidence that the Milk Wagon Drivers' Union used threats and
violence in an effort to help the large processor-distributors main-
tain the retail and wholesale price of milk in Chicago against the
price cutting efforts of independent dealers.1 2
169 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-Twin City Sales Area, (1936) p. 2.
170 Federal Trade Commission Summary Report on Conditions with
Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products, sub-
mitted to Congress Jan. 4, 1937, p. 6; Report of the Federal Trade Corn-
mission on the Sale and Distribution of Milk Products-Connecticut and
Philadelphia Milksheds, (1935) p. 3, no. 4; Report of the Federal Trade
Commission on the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Milk Products-
New York Milk Sales Area, (1937) 98-101.
"'1See Cassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices, Presented at the Depart-
ment of Economics of Harvard University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, March 30, 1934, chs. v,
vii, viii, ix. Prof. Chaddock arrived at practically the same conclusion.
He found that "monopoly price fixing by producers is very likely not to
work out permanently for the benefit of producers themselves." Report
of the Mayor's Committee on Milk, City of New York (1917) 71. A
recent English study would seem to substantiate this view. Cohen, The
History of Milk Prices (1936).
172 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distri-
bution of Milk and Milk Products-Chicago Sales area, (1936) pp. 15-19.
Accord: (Aug. 16, 1937) 44 Dairy Produce (5) : 10 (Injunction granted
Douglas Dairy Co. of Chicago against Milk Drivers Union).
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The commission took cognizance of the effect of court decisions
holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act invalid, and of other
court decisions so seriously limiting state control as to make it
ineffective to meet the necessities. They recommended that since
a large percentage of the transactions involved in the production
and distribution of milk are intrastate, and since state control could
be frustrated due to the inability of one state to forbid imports of
milk from another, Congress should enact legislation empowering
an appropriate federal authority to confer and advise with states
in the preparation of interstate milk compacts. In this way, the
commission felt that the sale of milk both in intrastate and in
interstate commerce could perhaps be regulated in a way consistent
with the constitution and agreeable to the signatory states.1t3
II. THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS IN AcriON
A. Cooperative Associatimis.' 4-- When the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law was passed in 1890, the cooperative marketing of dairy
products was still in its infancy so far as the development of large-
scale marketing associations was concerned. Associations of the
size we have today were not contemplated, and the possibility that
farmers' cooperative organizations would require any exemption
from this law or similar state legislation was very remote at that
time. Nor were there any effective lobbying or legislative agencies
in Washington at that time. The rapid development of large-
scale cooperative organizations following the enactment of the
national and state anti-trust laws, however, soon raised questions
concerning the effect of such laws on cooperatives. Interest of
farming people in this question became heightened by the prosecu-
tion of several farmers' organizations under state anti-trust laws,
in which their activities were held to run counter to common law
principles, as well as to the provisions of the anti-trust statutes.
This action on the part of the courts led to agitation for legis-
173Federal Trade Commission Summary Report on Conditions with
Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products, sub-
mitted to Congress Jan. 4, 1937, pp. 41-42.
174For an excellent historical picture of the development of coopera-
tive dairying, see Federal Trade Commission, Cooperative Marketing of
Farm Products (1928) pp. 7-46; Report of the Joint Legislative Com-
mittee to Investigate the Milk Industry 98, Legislative Doc. (1933) No. 114.
Albany, 1933.
For a very full collection of materials, see McLaughlin, Cases on the
Federal Anti-Trust Laws of the United States 548-550. Also Mears
and Tobriner, Principles and Practices of Cooperative Marketing (1926)
and Hanna, Law of Cooperative Marketing Associations (1931).
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lation affording farm organizations relief from the operation of
these laws. In this fight for a change in the Sherman Law, the
farmers and labor unions made common front. By 1914 there
was an overwhelming demand that farmers' cooperative organiza-
tions and labor unions be excluded from the operation of that
act by some specific amendment. They claimed that the Sherman
Act had been intended primarily to prevent abuses of power by
large industrial and mercantile corporations. As a result of con-
siderable pressure, Congress in 1914 passed the Clayton Act,
which amended the Sherman Act and which was supposedly in-
tended by section 6 to exclude labor, agricultural, and horticultural
organizations from the operation of the Sherman Act."'
The situation relative to the legal status of the cooperative
associations was not entirely clarified by the enactment of this
provision, since it contained the words "not having capital stock or
conducted for profit." There were a large number of farmers'
organizations having capital stock, which partook to a certain
degree of the elements of a strictly commercial corporate organiza-
tion. A feeling of uncertainty as to their exact status under the
provisions of the Clayton Act led to efforts for additional legis-
lation, which resulted in the enactment of the Capper-Volstead
Act in 1922.176
This law allowed the organization of marketing associations
with or without capital stock, provided that they conformed to
one or both of the following requirements: (1) each member shall
have only one vote; (2) association does not pay dividends on
stock or membership capital in excess of 8 per cent. In addition,
the group could not deal in the products of non-members to a
greater extent than those of members1 7
17538 Stat. at L. 731, sec. 6. "That the labor of a human being is
not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-
trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from law-
fully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organi-
zations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal com-
binations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws."
17642 Stat. at L. 388, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 291, Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
7, sec. 291. It is interesting to note that this legislation resulted because
a specific language change was desired as well as additional exemption
and not because the courts construed sec. 6 of the Clayton Act as failing
to exclude agricultural cooperative organizations from the operation of
the Sherman Act. By contrast, it is rather bewildering to see what the
courts did to sec. 6 when applied to labor unions.
177This weakened the cooperative movement's non-profit character,
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Under the Capper-Volstead Act, the secretary of agriculture
is given the supervision of cooperative organizations, and he has
power to investigate, and to issue cease and desist orders. and
enforce them in the courts if he feels an association is monopolizing
or restraining trade.' However, the act apparently does not re-
move the jurisdiction of the department of justice in the enforCe-
ment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, nor that of the Federal
Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission and
Clayton Acts, though it is very unlikely that either would act
without first conferring with the department of agriculture.
The cooperative movement was given further aid by Congress
when it passed the Cooperative Marketing Act of July 2, 1926."' 9
It provided for the creation of a division of cooperative market-
ing in the department of agriculture to disseminate information
about cooperatives and to help them in various ways. It also
allowed the cooperative associations themselves to interchange
information.""
On March 4, 1927, Congress passed a piece of legislation which
encouraged the further expansion of the activities of coopera-
tives.""' It prevented the discrimination of boards of trade against
farmers' cooperative associations becoming members of such
boards, and provided remedies."8 2
B. Administrative and Court Application.18 3-Beyond acting
since it allowed them to deal in non-members' products and to pay unlim-
ited dividends if they used the unit rule of voting.
"1sIt should be noted that when the labor groups finally got legisla-
tion through Congress successfully exempting labor unions from the opera-
tion of the Sherman Law, it contained no provisions for administrative
control as strong as this. Neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor the
Wagner Act provides for such a club over the organizations involved.
17944 Stat. at L. 802, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 455, Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
7, sec. 455.
'
80 In spite of all this legislation, counsel as late as 1933 argued that
the contract between milk producers and a cooperative association in which
the producers appoint the association as sales agent and agree to deliver
milk to designated stations is a violation of the Sherman Act. Local
Dairymen's Cooperative Association, Inc., v. Potvin, (R. I. Superior Court,
1933) 14 R. I. Law Record, No. 7, p. 60.
18144 Stat. at L. 1423.
'82This Congressional wet nursing of agricultural cooperatives is fur-
ther exemplified by the fact that they are excluded from the operation of the
Federal Income Tax. Sec. 101(1) and sec. 101 (12), Revenue Act of 1936.
Public-No. 740-74th Congress. Sec. 8 (c) (5) (F) of Agricultural
Adjustment Act also gives them favored class treatment.
'
8 3Though it seemed expedient in the above section to treat agricultural
cooperatives generally in discussing the relationship between them and the
anti-trust laws, it does not seem necessary or appropriate to consider court
decisions relating to cooperatives under the federal anti-trust laws which fall
outside of the milk industry field.
There have been numerous dissertations on the general field of court
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as a threat in reserve if the milk industry behaves badly, the
Federal Anti-Trust Laws have not had very much effect on the
field.. The department of justice evidently concluded that the dif-
ficulties of successful enforcement were too great, even though
acknowledged monopolistic conditions existed from an economic
viewpoint. One of these obstacles was described rather vividly
by a writer discussing state anti-trust laws when he said :184
"The purpose of these laws is to restrain monopoly and pre-
vent an interference with competition. To a great extent these
statutes have not brought the relief hoped for. Manufacturers
and middlemen have learned the great advantages that come
from agreements or understandings which eliminate competition.
"These understandings need not be in writing or formally
made. They may be in the form of what is known as an under-
standing or a 'gentlemen's agreement.' It is practically impossible
to frame a law, no matter how stringent, which will reach the
so-called 'gentlemen's agreement.'
Added to this problem of evidentiary proof were the additional
factors of demand for integration by practical dairymen and
technicians, court reversals, interstate vs. intrastate commerce,
and a probable feeling on the part of courts and prosecutors as
well as some sections of the public that it was not fair to exempt
milk producers' cooperatives and not give wide leeway to processor-
distributors. Coupled with this latter feeling was the practical
thought that perhaps it would be impossible to comply with the
spirit of acts exempting cooperatives unless processor-distributors
who played ball with the cooperatives were also exempted.
However, attempts were made to enforce the federal anti-
trust acts against parts of the milk industry, and some were
successful. The most important of these cases was United States
v. Whiting.185 Indictments were returned May 26, 1911, charging
first, a conspiracy in restraint of trade in milk throughout New
England, and second, a combination to restrain and monopolize
trade in milk throughout New England. The defendants demurred
to both indictments, and the cases were argued on demurrers to-
gether. The facts of the indictments stated that the several
defendants who bought 86 per cent of the milk sold in specified
applications of federal and state anti-trust laws to agricultural cooperatives.
Among them are: Nourse, The Legal Status of Agricultural Co-operation,
chs. x, xi, xiv, xv, and xvi, and Federal Trade Commission, Cooperative
Marketing of Farm Products, (1928) sees. 6, 7, and 8, pp. 336-342.
184Edward R. O'Malley, Attorney General of New York, (1910) Report
to the Legislature in the Matter of the Milk Investigation, p. 16 et seq.185(D. Mass. 1914) 212 Fed. 466.
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country districts in Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts for shipment to and sale in Boston and
vicinity, and in Worcester, had conferred together and agreed
upon uniform prices to be paid by them during each six months'
period to the producers of milk so purchased. The indictment
further stated that milk prices received by milk producers had
been lowered as a result of the agreement. Judge Morton in his
opinion sustained the demurrer to the first indictment charging
conspiracy in restraint of trade, since it did not "allege facts war-
ranting a finding by the jury that the restraint was unreasonable."
The demurrer to the first count of the latter indictment charging a
combination to restrain trade was overruled, since the count
alleged facts from which a jury could have found undue, un-
reasonably extensive, and illegal combination in restraint of trade.
The demurrer to the second count of the latter indictment charg-
ing monopoly was sustained because the facts showed only an
agreement to eliminate competition as to price in batying between
the defendants, and not an attempt to dominate or control the
markets in which they sold their milk purchased pursuant to the
agreement.
"Certain of the defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere
and the case was continued as to them pending disposition of the
case against the remaining defendants. On October 22, 1923 de-
fendant Whiting paid a fine of $500 in lieu of costs, and the cases
were filed as to the remaining defendants."1""
In United States v. Elgin Board of Trade,187 a petition was
filed December 14, 1912, in the federal court for the Northern
District of Illinois, charging defendants with combining and con-
spiring in the interest of a number of large contralizing concerns
to restrain interstate commerce in butter and butterfat, and
arbitrarily fixing the price thereof to obtain throughout the United
States. A decree granting the relief sought was entered without
contest on April 27, 1914.18 United States v. Chicago Butter &
Egg Board""9 was a similar case, in which the Court held the
government entitled to the relief sought, and a final decree to that
effect was entered on October 12, 1914.
lS6The Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 109.
'
87The Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 120.
18 80n November 3, 1917, the Elgin Board of Trade was requested to
close for the period of the World War by the U. S. Food Administrator in
order to eliminate the "possibility" of manipulation and speculative trading.
Federal Trade Commission Report on Milk, 1914-1918, p. 117.
189The Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 105.
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In United States v. Jensen Creamery Co.,"10 an indictment was
returned February 24, 1917, in the district court of Idaho against
eight corporations and eleven individual defendants, charging them
with combining and conspiring to restrain and monopolize inter-
state trade and commerce in creamery and dairy products in the
northwestern states. In February, 1919, the Jensen Creamery
Co., one of the corporate defendants, pleaded guilty and was
fined $7,500. The trial of the remaining defendants resulted in
a verdict of acquittal.
In United States v. Simpson,"' an indictment was returned
April 2, 1917, in the supreme court of the District of Columbia,
charging defendants with entering into an agreement as to the
prices at which they would sell milk in the District of Columbia
during the months of May to September, inclusive, 1916, and in
pursuance of which uniform and increased prices were fixed and
maintained. Nolle prosequi was entered on April 23, 1923.
A decision that is of particular interest today due to the ver-
tical and horizontal expansion of processor-distributors in the milk
industry is United States v. National Food Products Corpora-
tion.1 9 2 There a petition was filed in the United States district
court for the Southern District of New York on February 13,
1926, to prevent and restrain violations of section 7 of the Clayton
Act, through acquisitions of stock in competing chain store gro-
ceries and other companies engaged in the transportation of milk
and other dairy products, ice cream, and similar frozen products.
A consent decree was entered March 4, 1926, granting the relief
sought.193
As can be seen, the Anti-Trust Acts had little effect on the milk
industry until they were suspended with the advent of the AAA.
This was mainly due to the fact that the situation of the milk
industry is not favorable to a natural or an engineered monopoly.
And in fact, there have never been any fact monopolies in the milk
industry, despite the tremendous centralization which has taken
19OThe Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 138.
191The Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 139.
'92The Federal Antitrust Laws with Amendments (1931) 195.
193Cf. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Kutter, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1906) 147
Fed. 51, 77 C. C. A. 315, where the defendant railroad company entered into
a contract with plaintiff whereby the plaintiff was given the exclusive privi-
lege of trmisporting milk into New York City over the defendant's lines
"so far as it was permitted to do so by law." Held: Such contract was not
a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Writ of certiorari denied;
D. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Rutter, (1906) 203 U. S. 588, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776,
51 L. Ed. 330. Should it make a difference that the control over transporta-
tion is exercised by means of stock control rather than by contract?
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place with both the producers and with the processor-distributors.
As long as a man can buy a cow and peddle his milk, there is not
too much danger of monopoly even in our congested urban centers.
Therefore, the AAA has been rather anomalous, since it has
forced the growth of monopolies for the artificial control of mar-
keting and production, and has resented the little fellows going
into business. This is contrary to the entire tradition of the
American people, and the inevitable trend in the milk business
seems to be back to a competitive system in which the government
sits by as the watchdog.
III. PROPOSALS.
If affirmative state or federal control of milk prices and of
marketing and production is desired, it can only come about through
some technique which will allow the powers of both to be pooled.
The following are offered as possible starting points:
1. Interstate Compacts.19 4-This remedy which has been ad-
vanced most recently by the Federal Trade Commission °'" was
suggested as early as 1934 by John J. Bennett, Jr.,19 Attorney
General of New York. Still later the Harvard Law Review gave
its cautious blessing to such a plan,1" and suggested the use of the
formula advanced by Mr. Frankfurter and Mr. Landis in handling
interstate compacts. 198
The New England Milk Shed Authority Plan'19 was an at-
tempt to give tangible form to these many suggestions. In further
execution of this purpose, Representative Casey of Massachusetts
introduced a bill into Congress,- 0 authorizing the New England
States and New York to enter into an agreement whereby a fair
and equitable milk marketing plan would be established and en-
forced by a joint authority of the states comprising the milkshed.
Later Senator Royal S. Copeland introduced a bill into Con-
194Dimock and Benson, Can Interstate Compacts Succeed, (1937) have
a good general discussion.95Note 173.
196(1934) New York, Attorney General Report 323. See to like effect
(1936) Massachusetts Attorney General Report, 7.
197(1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1438.
19 8Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-
A Study in Interstate Adjustment, (1925) 34 Yale L J. 685.
199Drafted by Mr. Park Carpenter, Boston, Mass. attorney, January 28,
1937 (Mimeographed). Cf. State Compacts, United States Chamber of
Commerce, (March, 1937).
O01House Joint Resolution 170, 75th Congress, 1st Session, January 28,
1937.
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gress20 1 providing among other things for the establishment of a
Bureau of Coordination of Milk and Milk Products Regulation in
the Department of Agriculture. One of the duties of the Bureau
would be to encourage, promote and negotiate the adoption of in-
terstate compacts concerning the production, sale and distribution
of milk and milk products.
Both of these bills were sent to committee, and there has been
little recent evidence of activity to bring about the creation of any
milk authority by interstate compact.
Most of the state officials are not overly sanguine about what
may reasonably be accomplished by compacts. However, it would
seem that they offer much more hope of successful control than
does the present system.210
2. National-State Cooperation.2 03-By this method the federal
and state bodies would issue a joint order and secure a joint
agreement from the producers, which would be administered by
a single administrator having joint powers of agency. It is a rela-
tively unexplored field, but seems to have worked well in the Fort
Wayne, Indiana marketing area, where it as yet has not been
questioned. 204 The Indiana Milk Control Board reports that it is
"efficient and workable," and that they are contemplating addition-
al concurrent orders in LaPorte County and Floyd County.0 5
If federal and state milk regulation continue in a command role,
this type of coordination is going to become even more important
201Senate 2359, 75th Congress, 1st Session, May 6, 1937. See also the
statement of explanation made by Senator Copeland in connection with
the introduction of the bill.202Abel, Commodity Price Control: A Comparative Study in Federal
Constitutions, (Submitted to Professor Thomas Reed Powell in fulfillment
of the requirements in the Constitutional Law Seminar, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Mass., May, 1937) p. 96 after an exhaustive analysis of
the efforts of the Australian and Canadian Federations to control commodity
prices concludes that conjoint action is not effective. This same author re-
views in detail all the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand cases on gov-
ernment control of milk prices.2o3Corwin, (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 599. Also consult A Proposed Order
to Govern Interstate Shipments of Milk for the New York-New Jersey
Metropolitan Marketing Area; Governor's Committee on Interstate Milk
Relations, in cooperation with the Secretary of Agriculture, for the con-
sideration of Dairymen, October 4, 1935 (Tentative Draft) ; Milk Con-
trol Hearing called jointly by the New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
Committee on Interstate Cooperation, Council of State Governments (Feb.
1, 1936, Mimeo.) ; Comment (April 28, 1934) 110 Pa. Farmer 239.
204Milk Regulation in New York, Comment (1937) 46 Yale L. J.
1359, 1367.
205According to a letter from Mr. Charles G. Dailey, Attorney, Milk
Control Board of Indiana.
GOVERNMENT AND THE MILK INDUSTRY
as an attempt at a solution of the constitutional and administrative
problems.
3. Federal Delegation of Partial Sovereignty.0 q--It is sug-
gested that this might be achieved by having Congress adopt
enactments which either:
(a) Provide that all milk shipped into a state shall upon ar-
rival at its destination therein be subject to the "police laws" of the
state to the same extent as if it had originated there; or
(b) Provide that any state may apply to milk of extra-state
origin all laws constitutionally applicable to milk of local origin;
or
(c) Provide that any state may exclude from the state all
extra-state milk which is not produced under price standards ap-
plicable to milk of local origin; or
(d) Provide that a federal tax of so many cents per hundred
pounds of milk or its equivalents shall be imposed on all milk or
milk prodficts transported in interstate commerce which are not
bought from producers or sold to consumers according to the
minimum price fixed by the state milk control agency of the state
into which the milk is introduced for consumer utilization.2o
4. State Taxing Power.-What would the reaction of the
courts be to a state statute which:
(a) Placed a tax of so many cents a quart on the retail sale
2061n the manner of the Ashurst-Summers Prison Goods Act held valid
in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad, (1936) 299
U. S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 270. In the recent case of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., (April 25, 1938) (sustaining an Act pro-
hibiting the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce) Mr. Justice
Stone as organ for the court said: "Hence Congress is free to exclude
from interstate commerce articles whose use in the state for which they are
destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare .... or which contravene the policy of the state of their
destination."
This would seem to lend strength to the view that a Congressional
enactment, preceded by a factual study showing its economic and sanitary
necessity, would stand if it prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce
of milk or its products which were produced contrary to the laws of the
state into which they were to be introduced.
207These were all "inspired" by Professor Thomas Reed Powell's ex-
amination in constitutional law at the Harvard Law School, June, 1937. The
writer is sure that "only God and Thomas Reed Powell know the answers."
H. R. 4746 by Representative Smith of Virginia, 75th Congress, 1st
Session, February 15, 1937, is broad enough to lend itself to use in this
manner, although the hearings (transcript only is available) indicate no
such intention.
Sec. 258-M, 8, at p. 13, Rogers-Allen Law, New York, Laws 1934
for provision applying to New York state law to extrastate milk if
such federal legislation is passed.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of all milk except such milk as has been purchased from producers
at a price not less than the minimum fixed by the state milk con-
trol agency ?208
5. Control by Government-Participation in Competition.-
It has been suggested that a conjoint federal-state policy of price
fixing (either maximum or minimum), whereby the state and
the federal governments would enter the market and buy and sell
when either the supply or the demand were off balance, is the
soundest administrative and constitutional method of achieving
continued stabilization. 0 9 Such a system would be executed by
means of federal grants-in-aid to the states who executed their
parts in the basic federal policy.
IV. SELF DETERMINATION.
Many persons within the milk industry feel that affirmative
government (state or federal) control of milk prices is undesir-
able.
They believe that it is impossible to prevent general business
declines with their accompanying sapping of urban purchasing
power, or to abolish surplus production and high costs of distribu-
tion with or without governmental control. However, they do
suggest that governmental legislation can strengthen the bargain-
ing power of the dairy farmers, so that they will receive a fair
share of the total returns. Thus, they can maintain a position
which will always be proportionate in flux to that of transportation,
labor, distribution and consumers.210
Such feelings gave rise to the Rogers-Allen Act,2t ' and to the
208This was likewise suggested by Professor Powell's examination.
209Abel, Commodity Price Control: A Comparative Study in Federal
Constitutions, (Submitted to Professor Thomas Reed Powell in fulfillnent
of the requirements in the Constitutional Law Seminar, Harvard L'iw
School, Cambridge, Mass., May, 1937), chap. III, pp. 239-308; he reaches
the conclusion that such a program would be perfectly constitutional.
21OCf. A Lesson from the Milk Industry, National City Bank of New
York Monthly Letter on Economic Conditions, Governmental Finance,
U. S. Securities, Jan., 1933, pp. 13-15. Mr. S. McLean Buckingham,
Connecticut Milk Administration in his Report of the Milk Administrator,
Jan. 29, 1936 and Dec. 31, 1936 indicates.his belief that strong producers'
cooperatives are the real solution.
A similar viewpoint is taken in the Report of the Milk Control Board,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, House No. 328, Nov. 30, 1936. The
addresses and discussion at the Northeastern Dairy Conference, Hartford,
Conn., Jan. 24 and 25. 1938 (Proceedings mimeographed by the Consolidated
Reporting Co., 1133 Broadway, N. Y. C.) conclusively prove that this is
what the industry is groping for.
2llNo. 3240, In Assembly, State of New York, May 6, 1937. (Art. 21.
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Kopplemann Bill2 112 which allow producers' associations or distribu-
tors to organize, respectively, overhead producers' bargaining
agencies and distributors' bargaining agencies which can then
by dealing with one another fix the producers' and/or resale price
for milk. Provisions are included which would seem to serve as a
protection to the consuming public's interest against monopolistic
practices.2 13
This legislation was engendered by the history of milk market-
ing and practical experience. In looking back, it is seen that the
fundamental aim of government in its relationship to commodity
prices is to bring about a balance of bargaining power between
sellers and buyers. The federal and state anti-trust laws all were
enacted with some such aim.
In the case of the milk industry, we see that the anti-trust
laws never were effective in preventing gains by processor-dis-
tributors as buyers at the expense of producers as sellers. This
was heightened by the tendency in the processing-distributing
field constantly to integrate under banker management the small
units into powerful organizations often nationwide in their
scope.21 The results were that there was gross inequality of bar-
ch. 48, secs. 258-K-L-M-N).
A Connecticut Committee reporting in Sept. 1936 felt that the "federa-
tion" of producers was necessary for successful operation of any plan in
the milk business. Report of the Milk Marketing Program Committee,
Charles A. Beard Chairman, State of Connecticut (Sept. 28, 1936).
But a Comment, Milk Regulation in New York (1937) 46 Yale L. J.
1259, 1268 states that the Rogers-Allen act will do little good.
212H. R. 8311, 75th Congress, 1st Sess., August 20, 1937. See the
Extension of Remarks by the Hon. Herman P. Kopplemann on Dairy Pro-
ducer Cooperatives, Congressional Record-Appendix (August 16, 1937)
p. 12, 521 et seq.
This bill provides penalties modeled on those imposed by the Wagner
Act, for processor-distributor interference with cooperative organization.
The bill could be improved by placing its administration in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture rather than in the Federal Trade Commission.213 0n August 30, 1937 the United Milk Producers of Cleveland, Ohio
organized an overhead bargaining agency with five producers' organiza-
tions as members. This was done without any special state legislation other
than the usual state cooperative laws. It is a further indication of the
tendency of the times. (Sept., 1937) 38 The Dairy Record (14) : 8, CoL 1.
A committee of the Texas Legislature after surveying conditions in
Texas as regards the milk industry pointed out that the main cause of
trouble was that the producer was "dissatisfied in principle with a system
which proposes a bargain and in which he is completely unrepresented and
unprotected." Report of the Committee to Investigate the Dairy Industry,
House Journal, Texas Legislature, 44th Leg., 2d called sess. (1935) p. 617.
214Mr. Harvey P. Hood, 2nd points out all the reasons why mergers in
particular communities should be encouraged. An Address on New England
Milk and Government Control delivered before the Rotary Club of Boston,
September 25, 1935. Published by H. P. Hood & Sons, (October, 1935).
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gaining position, with the exception of the unusual period during
and after the World War.215
Producers early tried to remedy and strengthen their position
as sellers by joining into cooperative marketing associations. This
movement was aided by government enactments over a long period
of years. But try as they would, it seemed that they could not
catch up with the processor-distributors.
With the coming of the depression years, the leaders of pro-
ducers were swept away by the general beclouded thinking of that
era, and abandoning their old task, plugged and lobbied for formal
federal and state fixing of prices for milk and milk products, and
got it.
216
However, after a time the more intelligent leaders of milk
producers came to see that any advantages to them were temporary
(being a creature of price levels), and that instead of such govern-
mental regulation strengthening their bargaining position, its long
time effect would be seriously to weaken it. 217
Thus, we see that the probable future movement of government
will be to strengthen the bargaining position of producers, while
keeping hands off of prices and production, thereby facilitating
effective and equitable bargaining between producers' units and
processor-distributors' representatives. 18
It would seem that such a legislative program will not violate
the spirit of the anti-trust legislation, since it provides for real
competition under the watchful supervision of specified govern-
ment officials, who are to see to it that nothing interferes with the
2 1 5
"What the dealers are doing to farmers is what some employers did
to labor for many years. . . . the dairy farmer is not going back to that
time when he was completely at the mercy of the man who purchased his
milk." Senator George F. Rogers of the New York Legislature, 84
American Creamery and Poultry Produce Review, No. 17, Aug. 18, 1937,
p. 525, col. 1.
2a6 See Wallace, New Frontiers (1934) 56, 67.
2 17As indicating some such realization, see the speeches by Charles
W. Holman, Secretary of the National Cooperative Milk Producers'
Federation, and Dr. Edward Gaumnitz, Chief, Dairy Section, AAA, before
the 13th Annual meeting of the American Institute of Cooperation, lowa
State College, June 26, 1937, (July, 1937) 26 The Milk Dealer, No. 10,
p. 60.
2 18The effectiveness of the Rogers-Allen Act in bringing about a
strengthening of the bargaining power of the producer is illustrated by the
increase in the price of milk granted to the Metropolitan Cooperative Milk
Producers' Bargaining Agency, Inc., by the New York Metropolitan Milk
Distributors' Bargaining Agency on August 25, 1937, 84 American Cream-
ery and Poultry Produce Review, No. 18, August 25, 1937, p. 542, col. 2.
Contrast the conclusions of Burns, Decline of Competition and Fetter,
Masquerade of Monopoly.
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operation of the natural economic factors219 adjusting supply and
demand.
From a purely legal standpoint this would seem to be the most
satisfactory, practical result, due to the constitutional difficulties in
the way of effective fiat price fixing by either the state or federal
governments.
V. CONCLUSIONS.
The issues involved between compulsory competition and con-
trolled competition (regulated monopoly) are fundamental. The
public has never had a clear cut opportunity to make its decision
on this matter. For a people who pride themselves on their ener-
getic democracy, and whose leaders vie with one another in loud
affirmations of faith in its tenets, the situation is intolerable. Why
continue this hodge-podge of evasion?
The basic problem before the members of the dairy industry
today is self-control, not governmental control. Certainly all careful
students of the history of milk control and regulations in the
United States and in our fellow-democracies, New Zealand, Eng-
land, Canada, Australia and France, must admit that the use of
governmental coercion as it has been used is a poor institutional
method to bring about that "agricultural, economic democracy"
which all members of the milk industry desire at heart.2 2 0
The idea that the farmer as a producer is an important cog
in the industry is today everywhere admitted. Likewise, it is
recognized that the producer should have a larger voice in deter-
mining and influencing those factors which by intricate by-play
inevitably affect and fix milk prices.2 2 1 Thus, the big job is picking
an institutional method which will most easily and satisfactorily
2190bjections of the Milk Consumers' Protective League of New York
City, the Progressive Women's Council, the Housewives Milk League,
certain settlement workers and some borough consumers' organizations to
price increases were ineffective, even though enforced by picketing, (July,
1937) 26 The Milk Dealer, No. 10, p. 84, col. 2.
That the danger of the consumer paying for the monopoly gains of the
producer cooperatives and processor-distributors must be carefully guarded
against is indicated by Bacon and Cassels, The Milk Supply of Paris.
Rome and Berlin, (1937) 51 Quart. J. of Economics 630-631.
220Tinley, Economic Considerations in Milk Marketing Control, delivered
before the Third Annual Convention of the National Association of Milk
Control Boards, Portland, Ore., August, 1937 (mimeographed. Distributed by
the Oregon Milk Control Board, Terminal Sales Building, Portland,
Oregon.)221See Whiting, President's Address, Proceedings of the Twenty-
Seventh Annual Convention, General Sessions, International Association
of Milk Dealers, Cleveland, Ohio (1934) p. 19.
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achieve the admittedly desirable ends within the rigid limits of the
Anti-Trust Laws.
The soundest, the most practical in point of experience, and the
one riding the crest of the trend is one which allows the producer,
who has an accurate knowledge of local market conditions, to
exercise his influence and have his day by means of that institution,
known as the milk producers' cooperative. In this way we will
avoid both private and public collectivism, and will have achieved
a method of obtaining the highest possible level of production with
the lowest feasible level of prices.
After reviewing the experience of our state and national
governments with coercive tactics, it is fair to state that such
command attempts at a solution have failed, since they not only
did not bring about an improvement in the general welfare of the
producers, but in addition did not improve the condition of the
milk industry as a whole. 2 Nor is such an approach a democratic
one, since it puts by far too great a strain on institutions funda-
mentally designed to serve different purposes. Laws and regu-
lations unsupported by the active and effective public opinion of a
continuing, substantial majority of those affected, will not long
prove workable.
That is the situation in which compulsory governmental regu-
lation of the milk industry will always find itself since it is too
awkward and too bulky an institutional process to meet the "rough
elements" found in the kaleidoscopic economic, human, social,
weather, and political changes which always have been incident to
the milk industry.
If Congress and our Legislatures must do something for the
milk industry let them apply themselves to the development of
sanitary regulations and yardsticks of quality. When they have
done this, and have established a system for their effective en-
forcement, they will have stabilized the greatest disturbing factor
in milk prices of our times.22 3
222Spencer, Bulletin 365, Cornell -Univ., January, 1937.223A clear and concise idea of what a milk ordinance should contain,
and what the duties of the officials should be thereunder is contained in
Means of Improving the Quality of the Milk Supply, Parts I and II, Report
of the Production Advisory Committee, International Association of Milk
Dealers (1933).
The health laws should be such that any one may enter the milk industry
who will abide by the established standards and pay his share of maintain-
ing sanitation levels, regardless of his geographical position. Cf. Schultheiss,
Fluid Milk Market Stabilization in Wisconsin, Wisconsin Milk Control
Board (1937) 6-7.
At present, health ordinances are used at the behest of producer and/or
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The one additional thing which will then be needed is some
method of equalizing the returns of the bona fide producers. If
producers' cooperatives are effective this difficulty will be solved.::'
distributor groups to limit production areas and thus fix prices. This is
done to a greater or lesser degree in New York State, New England, Cleve-
land, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Milwaukee,
etc. Spencer, Practice and Theory of Market Exclusion Within the United
States, (1933) 15 Journal of Farm Economics; Catherwood, A Statistical
Study of Milk Production for the New York Market, published by Cornell
Univ. Agricultural Experiment Sta., Ithaca, N. Y., April, 1931 p. 8; Report
of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, Legis-
lative Doc. (1933) No. 114, Albany, 1933, p. 34; Milk for Millions, Con-
sumers Guide, (U.S. Dept. of Agri., August 9, 1937). Rhode Island
health officials went so far as to put coloring matter into out of state milk
to prevent its sale and promote the sale of locally produced milk This was
ended by an injunction of the U. S. Dist. Court. (1937) 84 American
Creamery and Poultry Produce Review, No. 17, p. 533, col. 2.
Such procedure seems contrary to the spirit of the anti-trust laws and
Baldwin v. Seelig (1935) 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032.
Would the Supreme Court allow the exclusion of out-of-state milk through
ostensible use of public health regulations?, See: Miller v. Williams, (D.
Md., 1935) 12 Fed. Supp. 236; Sheffield Farms v. Seamons, (1935) 114
N. J. L. 455, 177 Atl. 372; Grant v. Leavell, (1935) 259 Ky. 267, 82 S. W.
(2d) 283; Dist. of Columbia v. Leamon, (1932) 60 App. D. C. 395, 55 Fed.
(2d) 1020; Des Moines v. Fowler, (1934) 218 Iowa 504, 255 N. W. 880.22 4A classified price system is apparently an absolute necessity. Work
of the Division of Milk Control, of the New York State Department of
Agriculture and Markets for the year ending 1936, Circular 534 (1937)
pp. 12-13. To support it, and yet insure that one class of producers doesn't
fatten while another starves some type of pooling seems called for.
Whether this can be or should be done by government is open to
question. From the available cases the courts seem about equally divided
on it with perhaps a slight preponderance in its favor. United States v.
Whiting Milk Co., (D. Mass., 1937) 21 Fed. Supp. 321 gave its blessing to
a system of enforced equalization without any careful examination of its
fundamentals or of the cases and constitutional law. Honorable Hall S. Lusk
and L. G. Lewelling of the Oregon circuit court sustained a pooling scheme
without a very satisfactory discussion of due process or freedom of con-
tract. Summary of Present Legal Opinions of Milk Control Legislation,
Samuel B. Weinstein, Attorney, Oregon Milk Control Board (mimeo-
graphed, August, 1937) pp. 6-7. A. C. Munro & Sons Pty., Ltd. v. Sheehy..
[1934] Queensland S. R. 251; note (1934) 8 Australian L. J. 377 upheld
the pooling operations of the Queensland Butter Board and its equalization
practice. See also: Nebbia v. New York, (1934) 291 U. S. 502, 517-518,
54 Sup. Ct 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
Judge Howard W. Mountz of Auburn, Indiana invalidated the equaliza-
tion provisions of the Milk Marketing Agreement in the Ft. Wayne Area.
84 American Creamery and Poultry Produce Review, No. 18, August 25,
1937, p. 551, col. 2. In Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment
Committee, [1933] A. C. 168, affirming (1932) 2 D. L. R. 277 the British
Columbia Milk Control Statute, containing provision for an equalization
fund, was held bad because it constituted an indirect tax which it wvas beyond
the power of the province to impose.
